{"id":10707,"date":"2024-03-27T08:30:00","date_gmt":"2024-03-26T22:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/testblogs.griffith.edu.au\/asiainsights\/?p=10707"},"modified":"2026-01-14T09:26:24","modified_gmt":"2026-01-13T23:26:24","slug":"leaving-nothing-to-chance-sustaining-pacific-development-beyond-2024","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/testblogs.griffith.edu.au\/asiainsights\/leaving-nothing-to-chance-sustaining-pacific-development-beyond-2024\/","title":{"rendered":"Leaving nothing to chance: Sustaining Pacific development beyond 2024"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

ANNA NAUPA<\/a> AND TESS NEWTON CAIN<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Down<\/a>load PDF<\/a><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Introduction<\/h1>\n\n\n\n

The value proposition of Pacific regionalism in an increasingly dynamic geopolitical environment must balance the agreed rhetoric of Blue Pacific stewardship that drives a regional ethos, with the realpolitik of governments looking at shorter-term timeframes potentially at the expense of these stated values of custodianship. Maintaining Pacific agency and regional resolve will become increasingly tested in 2024.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This paper explores Pacific island countries\u2019 prospects in advancing sustainable development objectives in 2024. It considers what will be necessary to regain and sustain Pacific development gains while navigating a challenging economic and climate outlook amidst increasingly dynamic geopolitics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As 2024 forecasts for the Pacific region accumulate, three themes dominate: economic prospects, the climate outlook, and geopolitical dynamics. The latter has absorbed considerable media analysis of Pacific political currents in recent years, notably a pre-occupation by the West with China\u2019s Pacific islands relations. The persistent tension between an external framing of our region as the Indo-Pacific and our own framing of the Blue Pacific, will continue to shape the region\u2019s strategic engagement on shared security[1]<\/a> and development aspirations under the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent.<\/em>[2]<\/a> The strategy charts pathways for the region\u2019s political and economic cooperation under \u2018the Blue Pacific\u2019 umbrella, to drive collective engagement of Forum member states to ensure strategically beneficial partnerships for the region. At its adoption in 2022, Forum Leaders said, \u201cSecuring the future of the Pacific cannot be left to chance.\u201d[3]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

With six years remaining for countries to meet the ambition of the global Agenda 2030 on sustainable development, priorities are mapped out in national plans, the Pacific Roadmap for Sustainable Development[4]<\/strong><\/a> <\/em>and the 2050 Strategy, <\/em>the latter two guiding the work of the region\u2019s technical agencies, collectively referred to as the Council of Regional Organisations of the Pacific (CROP), in support of national needs. The financing requirements to meet this ambition are considerable, as are Pacific countries\u2019 responsibilities to both advance and monitor progress and the means of implementation. In 2024, five Pacific countries (Federated States of Micronesia, Palau, Samoa, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu) will be delivering Voluntary National Reviews (VNRs) on their progress towards meeting Agenda 2030.[5]<\/a> The VNR process is a chance for countries to show reasonable development progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and to highlight areas needing more support.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The interplay of Pacific countries\u2019 domestic realpolitik with geopolitical rivalries has a direct bearing on localised sustainable development outcomes.[6]<\/a> For example, the prioritisation of bilateral relations over collective diplomacy has been observed in relation to post-pandemic economic recovery and security partnerships in some Pacific island countries in 2023.[7]<\/a> These politics of development are also played out on a regional scale through the CROP in terms of coordinated access to collective resources.[8]<\/a> Combined, the pressure for Pacific island countries to control the geopolitical narrative, retain diplomatic agency and manage domestic political agendas, signal a trend that will make or break some key shared targets for the Pacific in 2024.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This paper is in three parts. The first part horizon scans the 2024 global outlook and considers the implications of the following key themes for the Pacific islands region: economic prospects, the climate challenge, and geopolitical tempo. The second part examines how these themes intersect with the following priorities: deepening regional resolve, safeguarding Pacific democratic cultures, and leveraging Pacific agency. By taking this intersectional approach, in the third and final section we arrive at recommendations for Pacific policy makers and their development partners, that we consider to be significant to sustaining positive gains for Pacific development in 2024.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

What the 2024 global outlook means for the Pacific region<\/h1>\n\n\n\n

Several global trends will have implications for the Pacific islands region and national governments alike.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Shaky economic prospects<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The World Economic Forum forecasts that protracted weaknesses in the global economy coupled with geopolitical rifts are expected to accelerate geo-economic fragmentation in 2024; more than half of the world\u2019s chief economists are expecting the global economy to weaken during the coming year.[9]<\/a> Elevated energy commodity prices in particular will continue to challenge Pacific countries\u2019 ongoing post-pandemic economic recovery efforts, despite a forecast decline of almost 5 per cent in 2024.[10]<\/a> The International Monetary Fund highlights the rising fragmentation in commodity markets, which can lead to high price volatility in 2024.[11]<\/a> Ongoing supply chain disruption is anticipated to further challenge the region as extreme weather events and conflict hit global trade choke points in the Panama Canal and the Red Sea.[12]<\/a> While inflation is forecast to lower to 4.8 per cent globally in 2024, this will vary within the Pacific as will GDP growth prospects, public debt levels and cumulative post-disaster recovery needs.[13]<\/a> Inevitably, the Pacific will continue to feel the ripple effects of global economic volatility via commodity pricing and global inflation from geopolitical flashpoints and conflict zones such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the Israel-Palestine conflict. Prioritising reliable supply chains and affordable commodities will be important for Pacific governments.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The climate challenge for Pacific island countries and the regional collective<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Several Pacific forecasters have noted that the series of global structural shocks to Pacific economies in 2023 continue to be compounded by the ongoing climate crisis.[14]<\/a> A continuing strong El Ni\u00f1o event, with below normal rainfall predicted for Pacific countries at distance from the equator, coupled with normal-to-enhanced risk for tropical cyclones in the eastern Pacific has implications for the region\u2019s food and water security.[15]<\/a> For example, the agriculture and fisheries sectors are particularly climate-sensitive sectors. Forecasts for the annual tropical cyclone season in the South Pacific suggest 4-8 severe tropical cyclones between November 2023 and April 2024.[16]<\/a> Storm surge, and coastal and river flooding will also continue to challenge communities and livelihoods. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has cautioned that climate-related hazards and associated risks in the near term are expected to also have implications for food, water- and vector-borne diseases adding to the burden on health systems.[17]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The increased pressure on developing health and transport infrastructure from more intense climate-induced severe weather events, and the subsequent post-disaster \u2019states of emergency\u2019 across the Pacific render governments and households in regular crisis mode, focused on basic access to food, water and shelter, stretching limited resources and disrupting hard-won development gains.[18]<\/a> The IPCC\u2019s Sixth Assessment Report has flagged the urgency for a dramatic increase in climate finance for both mitigation and adaptation, proposing that in the Pacific this needs to increase sixfold.[19]<\/a> Operating in regular emergency-mode and crisis response leaves little space for longer-term strategy implementation. The level of public debt incurred to address these challenges will remain a key priority for PICs, again driving governments\u2019 development partner choices in 2024.[20]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The bittersweet outcomes of COP28 offer a glimmer of optimism with the hard-won announcement of the operationalisation of the Loss and Damage Fund, with hopes that 2024 will not be as disappointing a year for global climate action as 2023.[21]<\/a> Pacific ambition to phase out fossil fuels will need to navigate the posturing of world powers in the search for a new world order beyond them, notwithstanding the IMF\u2019s caution that fragmentation of commodity markets could affect the costs of decarbonisation.[22]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Geopolitical shifts: Impacts on Pacific regionalism and national sovereignties<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Global political change in 2024 will also have implications for the Pacific. With over half the world\u2019s population going to the polls this year, including four Pacific countries, 2024 is a watershed year for global democracy.[23]<\/a> Leadership changes in globally significant elections such as in the United States, the United Kingdom, India, and Indonesia may shift Pacific engagement priorities. For example, the United States Congress has yet to enact legislation to allow for the implementation of the Compacts of Free Association (COFA) with the Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of the Marshall Islands, which includes major economic assistance to the countries in line with the Biden Administration\u2019s Indo-Pacific, Pacific Partnership and National Security strategies.[24]<\/a> The respective COFAs end in 2023, with Palau\u2019s COFA with the US ending in 2024. Combined, the total value is USD 10.4 billion (FY 2023 dollars) a significant contribution towards national service delivery and infrastructure needs.[25]<\/a> Micronesian leaders expressed concerns at the US funding delays, citing growing financial pressures are causing them to consider other partners.[26]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Driving Pacific development gains in 2024\u2014three essential elements<\/h1>\n\n\n\n

We see three essential elements that Pacific Island countries need to focus on as they collectively and nationally advance the Pacific’s development aspirations. By leaving nothing to chance, Pacific regionalism can ensure that 2024 makes a difference to the region’s economic prospects, climate outlook and engagement with dynamic geopolitics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

1. Deepening Pacific regional resolve<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

At the core, Pacific island countries\u2019 appetite for the collective diplomacy of the Blue Pacific has a bearing on the advancement of national and regional development aspirations. In 2024, continued competition to draw the Blue Pacific narrative into external geopolitical constructs such as the Indo-Pacific will strain existing political fault lines within and amongst Pacific Island Forum members. Navigating these external political dynamics will necessarily remain a focus for Pacific island countries as they balance bilateral opportunities with regional resolve. Across the various multilateral platforms and evolving global agreements, the Pacific region will be drawn into initiatives on a global scale that also have significance for the Pacific\u2019s 2050 aspirations and will require a strong Pacific diplomatic bloc, for example: <\/p>\n\n\n\n