The existence of \u2018hybrid regimes\u2019 occupying a grey zone between liberal democracy and closed authoritarianism is firmly established. This conceptual category is designed to capture those political regimes utilising democratic institutions, such as elections, albeit in a substandard way. Such a label has been frequently applied to Southeast Asia; a region presently comprised of three \u2018competitive authoritarian\u2019 regimes (Cambodia, Malaysia and Singapore) and two \u2018hegemonic authoritarian\u2019 regimes (Laos, Vietnam). Despite being conceptualised for their hybridity, which implies democracy exists in some way, these regimes are still \u2018recalcitrant\u2019 to democratisation (Emmerson 1995). This is indicative of how contestation and participation do exist, but in varying degrees of deficiency. In Cambodia, Malaysia and Singapore, for example, the incumbent regimes deliberately dilute the capacity of opposition parties to win office, intentionally infringe upon civil liberties and regularly abuse state resources to create an uneven playing field. This helps explain why the 2015 election victory of Myanmar’s National League for Democracy was nothing short of an anomaly for opposition parties in the region. In Laos and Vietnam, by comparison, the incumbent regimes legally bar opposition parties from existing, violate basic civil liberties through the use of overt repression and monopolise access to resources, media and the law. So what exactly is democratic about Southeast Asia’s pool of authoritarian regimes? Given the present state of contestation and participation, it is clear that a more critical examination is required into how the very institution that gives rise to the use of hybrid labels — in this case, elections \u2013 actually sustains authoritarian rule.<\/p>\n
This means studying the utility of elections from the functional perspective of authoritarian regimes, rather than democratic regimes. The question then becomes how ruling parties use elections to prolong their stay in power and, by extension, resist democratisation. An important contribution in this regard is Gerschewski’s (2013) theory of autocratic stability. In seeking to explain why some regimes survive and others perish, he assigned casual importance to co-optation, legitimation and repression. These pillars do not exist from the outset, but must be developed and reinforced in order to achieve inter-complimentary. A key problem, however, is that legitimation remains neglected by comparison to the other pillars. For a variety of normative and substantive reasons, Gerschewski (2013: 19) lamented how \u2018only anecdotal evidence is available as to why legitimation matters\u2019. Set against the backdrop of flawed elections, this article addresses this deficit.<\/p>\n