Since the 2008 global financial crisis China\u2019s diplomacy has moved towards a more confident or even assertive direction in international politics (He and Feng 2012; Perlez 2012; Pomfret 2010; Ross 2012; Swaine 2010, 2011; Swaine and Fravel 2011). In particular, the 2012 Scarborough Shoal crisis with the Philippines, the still on-going flare-ups with Japan regarding the Senkaku\/Diaoyu disputes, and the recently intensified tension with Vietnam in the South China Sea seemingly have further intensified regional concerns over China\u2019s rise (Greitens 2013). Although the extent and the nature of the assertiveness are still debatable (Johnston 2013), it is clear that China’s foreign policy has shifted to a new direction, albeit temporarily. Moreover, the term, ‘assertiveness’, can have different meanings in various contexts. It is normally interchangeable with ‘aggressiveness’ in the Western media, as Johnston has pointed out. However, some scholars also use the term to reflect how China turned to conduct a more ‘confident and active’ foreign policy (Christensen 2011).<\/p>\n
We adopt a neutral position to define ‘assertiveness’ as ‘strong and tough behaviour’. This article focuses on examining the perceptual roots of China’s policy turn in a ‘tough and strong’ direction. As David Shambaugh (1991) points out, behaviour is principally a function of perception. In order to make sense of Chinese behaviour, we need to dig into the mindset of Chinese leaders. However, it is difficult to gauge what political leaders really perceive due to the political hierarchy and the complex nature of the decision-making process in any state\u2019s political system, especially China.<\/p>\n
We intend to make sense of Chinese leaders’ perceptions and attitudes regarding Chinese foreign policy through the eyes of China’s International Relations (IR) scholars. We examine Chinese IR scholars\u2019 perceptions regarding the rise of China as well as China\u2019s international relations. As some scholars argue, Chinese IR scholars can serve as the mediator between the Chinese leadership and the general public (Saunders 2000; Shambaugh 1991). Based on an original opinion survey of Chinese IR scholars at the annual conference of the Chinese Community of Political Science and International Studies (CCPSIS) in Beijing in July 2013, we empirically test the perceptual roots of Chinese scholars’ preferences for an assertive diplomacy. It should be emphasised that we do not claim that Chinese scholars’ views necessarily represent or influence the perceptions of Chinese leaders or Chinese government. When discussing the academic utility of studying scholars’ views in China, Daniel Lynch (2015: x) nevertheless points out, ‘studying these (Chinese scholars’) images can be useful in trying to assess what trajectory is likely to become, precisely because the elites are operating inside parameters imposed by the (still) awesomely powerful Party-state’.<\/p>\n
In this study we examine two competing arguments about China’s assertiveness. Some scholars suggest a ‘power perception’ argument in which China’s assertiveness is rooted in Chinese leaders’ changing perceptions regarding its power status versus the United States. In other words, as the United States and other Western countries were troubled by their economic downturn, Chinese leaders became overly confident with China’s rise and thereby started to say ‘no’ to the United States as well as show its ‘teeth’ to its neighbours (Green 2010; Nye 2010).<\/p>\n