{"id":3602,"date":"2017-09-12T06:40:50","date_gmt":"2017-09-11T20:40:50","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/testblogs.griffith.edu.au\/asiainsights\/?p=3602"},"modified":"2023-08-06T15:45:06","modified_gmt":"2023-08-06T05:45:06","slug":"limiting-chinas-future-strategic-predominance","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/testblogs.griffith.edu.au\/asiainsights\/limiting-chinas-future-strategic-predominance\/","title":{"rendered":"Limiting China\u2019s future strategic predominance"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><a href=\"https:\/\/testblogs.griffith.edu.au\/asiainsights\/tag\/peter-layton\/\">PETER LAYTON<\/a>\u00a0|<\/p>\n<p>Mr Peter Varghese AO, recently retired Department of Foreign Affairs head, has laid out <a href=\"https:\/\/testblogs.griffith.edu.au\/asiainsights\/a-contested-asia-what-comes-after-us-strategic-predominance\/\">his vision of a possible new regional order<\/a>. \u00a0The order aims to limit China\u2019s regional strategic predominance when the US \u2013 intentionally or unintentionally &#8211; vacates this position. Achieving this is seen as requiring a novel form of a balance of power, a proposal sharply at odds with the Australian government vision of a rules-based order albeit not explicitly stated.\u00a0 In differing to official orthodoxy, the proposal is worth carefully examining.<\/p>\n<p>The China challenge for Peter is that the country seeks to place itself in the commanding centre of regional strategic arrangements \u201cin a pattern reminiscent of the Middle Kingdom.\u201d This ambition is steadily being achieved across Southeast Asia mainly through the workings of Chinese economic statecraft. This offers countries almost-irresistibly attractive economic and financial incentives, even though regional nations appreciate accepting these will progressively constrain their strategic options. \u00a0ASEAN states are being steadily drawn into <a href=\"http:\/\/www.theasanforum.org\/asian-security-after-us-hegemony-spheres-of-influence-and-the-third-wave-of-regional-order\/\">China\u2019s sphere of influence<\/a> where China will determine regional institutional arrangements, effectively exercising veto power over individual country\u2019s\u2019 strategic choices.<\/p>\n<p>The counter to China\u2019s creeping sphere of influence is seen as a adopting a balance of power order. Given that China uses economic statecraft, this balance of power is not the classic military balance type <a href=\"http:\/\/www.oxfordbibliographies.com\/view\/document\/obo-9780199743292\/obo-9780199743292-0083.xml\">International Relations theorists have long studied<\/a>. Instead, this is a combination of economic and military power with the economic more important. \u00a0Moreover, this balance should \u201cnot [be] an orchestrated arrangement\u201d but rather be \u2018organic\u2019 and gradually develop around the key players of the US, Japan and India. Peter declares that: \u201cAustralia can contribute\u2026by strengthening its strategic engagement with \u2026the Asian democracies, with priority given to Japan, India and Indonesia.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>The big question is whether such a grand strategy would succeed? In partly addressing this, two interrelated issues might be considered.<\/p>\n<p>Firstly, there is a good understanding of how the threat, or application, of military power is used in a traditional balance of power strategy to constrain the state being balanced against. Less apparent is how economic power might be used in such a manner. The presumption is the approach is more sophisticated than a simple summing of GDPs. Today <a href=\"http:\/\/statisticstimes.com\/economy\/countries-by-projected-gdp.php\">such a summation is greater than China\u2019s<\/a> (even using PPPs) and yet China\u2019s sphere of influence aspiration is clearly advancing. A more elaborate approach appears necessary.<\/p>\n<p>Reading between the lines, the notion implies that the US, Japan and India and others will seek to counter Chinese economic statecraft through building greater economic and financial linkages between themselves and presumably into threatened nations. These new linkages might then dislodge China as regional economic hegemon and make the states involved more economically robust in the face of Chinese strategic pressure.<\/p>\n<p>Chinese statecraft however has an advantage in such machinations in that <a href=\"http:\/\/www.scmp.com\/news\/china\/economy\/article\/2098755\/how-communist-party-controls-chinas-state-owned-industrial-titans\">many major companies<\/a> are <a href=\"https:\/\/www.ft.com\/content\/31407684-8101-11e7-a4ce-15b2513cb3ff\">effectively branches<\/a> of the Communist Party and receptive to state direction. Comparable enterprises in the balancing nations are driven more by commercial factors and would need some well-considered market-based incentives to focus their activities as implementing the strategy requires. Moreover, while being \u2018organic\u2019 is stressed, the balancing nations do not have a combined economic heft sufficiently large to allow a duplication of effort with its inherent \u00a0\u2018waste\u2019.\u00a0 Using economic and financial power to achieve the greatest impact across the various countries envisaged would require carefully coordination \u2013 not a hands off, hope-for-the-best approach.<\/p>\n<p>Secondly, as may already be apparent the proposed strategy plays to China\u2019s strengths. It is already the largest economy on a PPP basis and is steadily growing; its large population base gives it an internal market of considerable depth.\u00a0 Moreover, the proposed strategy fixates on only one aspect of Chinese national power.<\/p>\n<p>Chinese thinking has long incorporated a notion of comprehensive power where diplomatic, informational, military and economic power are combined and employed as an integrated package. China today <a href=\"https:\/\/www.lowyinstitute.org\/the-interpreter\/battle-southeast-asia-soul\">uses comprehensive strategic partnerships<\/a> to engage individual ASEAN states across a broad front. Countering China\u2019s influence may require more than simple economic might \u2013 particularly when China is strongest in that area. \u00a0A comprehensive power strategy of our own might be more efficacious.<\/p>\n<p>Indeed, China unsurprisingly has weaknesses in some areas.\u00a0 For example, its diplomacy often <a href=\"https:\/\/testblogs.griffith.edu.au\/asiainsights\/doklam-the-diplomacy-of-anger-and-the-sino-indian-standoff\/\">appears ham-fisted<\/a> apparently seeking regional anxiety rather than harmony.\u00a0 This may be because the Party (and its media organs) play to the internal audience in a bid to create a strident, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.lowyinstitute.org\/the-interpreter\/china-toxic-nationalism\">somewhat xenophobic<\/a>, nationalism.\u00a0 Even so, when China\u2019s diplomacy is more restrained, it seems unwilling to accommodate others\u2019 concerns \u2013 as the <a href=\"http:\/\/www.smh.com.au\/world\/asean-framework-on-south-china-sea-tiptoes-around-the-real-issue-20170807-gxqoap.html\">recent China-compliant Code of Conduct negotiations<\/a> suggest. \u00a0On the other hand, for the Chinese Communist Party, the country\u2019s Achilles&#8217; heel is perceived as internal social instability. The Party\u2019s legitimacy remains a persistent worry requiring constant vigilance and <a href=\"http:\/\/time.com\/4519160\/china-xi-jinping-cecc-human-rights-rule-of-law\/\">a focussed repression<\/a> that sharply undercuts its soft power.<\/p>\n<p>China\u2019s sphere of influence is steadily growing. Peter\u2019s vision implies that ASEAN is already lost except perhaps for Indonesia. This is a grim assessment with significant strategic implications for Australia (<a href=\"http:\/\/www.afr.com\/opinion\/columnists\/china-is-fighting-a-new-battle-for-southeast-asia-20170605-gwke7h\">others think similarly<\/a>). He is undoubtedly correct that \u201cwe\u2026need a sophisticated strategy for dealing honestly with the strategic uncertainties which lie ahead.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Dr Peter Layton is a Visiting Fellow at the Griffith Asia Institute, Griffith University.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>PETER LAYTON\u00a0| Mr Peter Varghese AO, recently retired Department of Foreign Affairs head, has laid out his vision of a possible new regional order. \u00a0The order aims to limit China\u2019s regional strategic predominance when the US \u2013 intentionally or unintentionally &#8211; vacates this position. Achieving this is seen as requiring a novel form of a [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":14,"featured_media":3608,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_dont_email_post_to_subs":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paywalled_content":false,"_jetpack_feature_clip_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":"","jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false},"categories":[233,245,246],"tags":[606,605,1082],"class_list":["post-3602","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-feature-series","category-china-and-north-east-asia","category-india-and-south-asia","tag-contested-asia","tag-mr-peter-varghese","tag-peter-layton"],"acf":[],"modified_by":"Jill Moriarty","yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v28.0 - 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As is customary, the\u00a0paradoxical nature\u00a0of war applies in that those impacted by a damaging strategy will over time devise optimised counter-moves. 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Particularly given China\u2019s \u201csystems confrontation\u201d focus, attacking battle networks is an\u2026","rel":"","context":"In &quot;Region | China and Northeast Asia&quot;","block_context":{"text":"Region | China and Northeast Asia","link":"https:\/\/testblogs.griffith.edu.au\/asiainsights\/category\/china-and-north-east-asia\/"},"img":{"alt_text":"Dark red technological map of the world with luminous dots, global information network on a digital screen","src":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/testblogs.griffith.edu.au\/asiainsights\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2023\/09\/Defence-technology-network.jpg?resize=350%2C200&ssl=1","width":350,"height":200,"srcset":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/testblogs.griffith.edu.au\/asiainsights\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2023\/09\/Defence-technology-network.jpg?resize=350%2C200&ssl=1 1x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/testblogs.griffith.edu.au\/asiainsights\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2023\/09\/Defence-technology-network.jpg?resize=525%2C300&ssl=1 1.5x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/testblogs.griffith.edu.au\/asiainsights\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2023\/09\/Defence-technology-network.jpg?resize=700%2C400&ssl=1 2x"},"classes":[]},{"id":5681,"url":"https:\/\/testblogs.griffith.edu.au\/asiainsights\/mobilising-defence-in-the-fourth-industrial-revolution\/","url_meta":{"origin":3602,"position":2},"title":"Mobilising Defence in the \u201cfourth industrial revolution\u201d","author":"Griffith Asia Institute","date":"19 April 2019","format":false,"excerpt":"PETER LAYTON\u00a0| Australia\u2019s future wars may not run to our timetable. Our recent wars of choice have allowed participation as and when we wished. 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The interweaving of the second and third industrial revolutions is creating the fourth. 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