The last fortnight was witness to two important summits between rival nations in the region, both significant for the apparent \u2018thaw\u2019 in bilateral relations that they symbolised. Yet, there is a great deal of circumspection on the prospects of any real rapprochement taking place, either between North and South Korea or between India and China. A third, less publicised but nevertheless important summit, that of the ASEAN leaders, was held as well.<\/p>\n
The Korean summit<\/a> held at Panmunjom after months of diplomatic to-and-fro, was hailed as historic. The Panmunjom Declaration for Peace, Prosperity and Unification of the Korean Peninsula, issued<\/a> at the end of the summit, lay the pathway for further progress in relations conditioned upon the denuclearisation of the peninsula and may even bring the Korean War to an official end<\/a>. Sceptics, however, aren\u2019t too optimistic<\/a> about Kim Jong-un\u2019s pledge on denuclearisation, arguing that Pyongyang had made such empty promises in the past and subsequently reneged. This summit was seen as preparation ahead of US President Donald Trump\u2019s much-publicised meeting with the DPRK leader in the very near future. Interestingly, Trump is taking credit for the improvement in relations between Seoul and Pyongyang, and Moon Jae-in even remarked<\/a> that the US President deserved a nobel peace prize for his role in bringing DPRK to the negotiating table.<\/p>\n In a surprise move<\/a> that disappointed<\/a> many, Trump nominated Admiral Harry B.\u00a0 Harris Jr. to become the next ambassador to South Korea, instead of sending him as his envoy to Canberra (which was to be the case earlier). The office of the US ambassador to Australia has been vacant for over a year<\/a>, which many consider a slight, given the close relations between the two countries. Although Foreign Minister Julie Bishop downplayed the significance of the decision, critics remarked that it sent a \u2018terrible message\u2019<\/a> to Australia and demonstrated that it wasn\u2019t high on the US priority list. Perhaps to assuage Australian concerns, the US then asked Canberra<\/a> for its own suggestions for a preferred candidate to fill the role.<\/p>\n After months of Indian overtures to China, Beijing issued an invitation to Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi for an \u2018informal summit\u2019<\/a> at Wuhan, to \u2018reset\u2019<\/a> relations between the two countries after the hostilities at Doklam<\/a> last year. Even so, there weren\u2019t any real expectations<\/a> of a breakthrough taking place in terms of tangible results. The individual statements issued by both parties after the summit demonstrated clear differences<\/a>– a point emphasised by the detractors on the Indian side<\/a>, who warn that China intends to wean India away<\/a> from a potential partnership with the US and its allies. Most tellingly, India announced<\/a> that it had rejected Australia\u2019s offer to participate in the 2018 US-Japan-India Malabar naval exercises, just before the Modi-Xi summit began. Although it is reported that the decision to exclude Australia was taken months ago, the timing of the announcement made it appear as if it was meant to placate Beijing<\/a>.<\/p>\n The 32nd<\/sup> ASEAN leaders\u2019 summit took place in Singapore last month, where officials drew up two comprehensive policy documents: Zero Draft of Chairman\u2019s Statement and the ASEAN Leaders\u2019 Vision for a Resilient and Innovative ASEAN. Two other documents<\/a> were also released: Concept Note for an ASEAN Smart Cities Network and the ASEAN Leaders\u2019 Statement on Cyber Security Cooperation. Analysts note<\/a> that while a range of security matters were discussed at the summit, cyber security was given special emphasis. However, critics point out that owing to ASEAN norms of consensus, South China Sea disputes received a \u2018subdued treatment\u2019<\/a>. Six out of the seven points on the South China Sea, prepared in the original draft of the Chairman\u2019s statement, were deleted<\/a> in the final version because of interventions by some countries, particularly Cambodia. Critics thus question<\/a> the ASEAN commitment to \u2018an ASEAN-centric regional architecture that is open, transparent, inclusive and rules-based.\u2019<\/p>\n Ironically, the ASEAN Chair sought the support<\/a> of the member countries to approach the Chair of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) to lodge a protest against \u2018the non-inclusion of an ASEAN reservation\u2019, on the South China Sea, in the Final Document released by the 18th<\/sup> Mid-Term Ministerial Meeting of the NAM held in Azerbaijan early last month.<\/p>\n In other news, French President Emmanuel Macron is on his visit<\/a> to Australia, days after Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull\u2019s visit<\/a> to Villers-Bretonneux on Anzac Day. The French President has invocated his vision to create a \u2018new Indo-Pacific Axis\u2019<\/a> with Australia as a key partner, dedicated to preserving the security, free trade and rule of law in the region. Macron has expressed his desire for France, being the only European power with\u00a0 territories in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, to be \u2018at the heart of the new Indo-Pacific axis<\/a>\u2019. Both leaders, while welcoming China\u2019s rise and growth as a global power, called on Beijing<\/a> to abide by the rule of law to preserve the liberal order. Notably, Turnbull has enthusiastically supported Macron\u2019s vision and has called France a \u2018Pacific Ocean power\u2019<\/a>. Moreover, Macron has warned against trying to resist China\u2019s Belt and Road Initiative, arguing that countries like Australia and France must use this opportunity to \u2018define the rules of the game\u2019<\/a> and ensure the preservation of sovereignty. Australia and France have entered into a series of agreements<\/a> to bolster defence and security ties, including measures to tackle cyber threats, and advance cooperation in education, innovation and climate change.<\/p>\n This fortnight has left Australia with much to ponder. Both major summits that took place were assessed to be long on optics and short on substance<\/a>.<\/p>\n Meanwhile, Turnbull and Bishop issued statements<\/a> of cautious optimism<\/a> regarding prospects of peace on the Korean Peninsula. Experts argue<\/a> that Canberra should be prepared to \u2018anticipate the full range of possible outcomes\u2019 and must be prepared for \u2018worst-case scenarios\u2019.<\/p>\n On the other hand, the US decision to send Admiral Harris to Seoul instead of Canberra, is also likely to add to Australian insecurity vis-\u00e0-vis the US commitment to Australia. In an unprecedented situation, the office of the US ambassador has been vacant<\/a> for over 19 months. Although the US is keen to emphasise that this move is not intended as a slight<\/a>, it is probable that Canberra might feel neglected. Already, there is a debate<\/a> about US reliability and Australian options, Down Under. This episode is going to add fuel to voices that advocate a more independent policy course for Australia.<\/p>\n India\u2019s refusal to allow Australia to join the Malabar naval exercise, even as an observer, is likely to disappoint many in Canberra. The move will probably leave a taste of bitterness in bilateral relations between Australia and India, significant because the latter has been touted as being one of Australia\u2019s key partners in Canberra\u2019s perception of the Indo-Pacific, as outlined in the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper.<\/p>\n Australia may feel disappointed about the ASEAN leaders\u2019 lack of consensus in taking a firm stance on the South China Sea disputes. The Foreign Policy White Paper envisages ASEAN as one of Australia\u2019s main partners in preserving a rules-based international order. Their reticence in committing more to the regional security architecture may concern Canberra.<\/p>\n President Macron has been warmly welcomed in Australia. France has, in the recent past, established strong credentials of being a stakeholder in the Indo-Pacific, by deepening maritime cooperation<\/a> with India. The president\u2019s statement<\/a> indicating France\u2019s aim \u2018to bolster the chain of democracies from Paris to Canberra via Delhi\u2019 may be interpreted as a pointed remark on growing Chinese assertiveness in the region and championing the rules-based order that Australia seeks to secure. The visit thus symbolises a new dimension to Australia\u2019s Indo-Pacific diplomatic geometrics, one that is likely to have significant bearings upon how Canberra perceives and defines the region.<\/p>\nSignificance for Australia<\/h3>\n