{"id":4577,"date":"2018-07-23T08:30:20","date_gmt":"2018-07-22T22:30:20","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/testblogs.griffith.edu.au\/asiainsights\/?p=4577"},"modified":"2023-08-06T14:34:16","modified_gmt":"2023-08-06T04:34:16","slug":"to-engage-china-or-balance-it-lessons-from-a-failed-grand-strategic-exercise","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/testblogs.griffith.edu.au\/asiainsights\/to-engage-china-or-balance-it-lessons-from-a-failed-grand-strategic-exercise\/","title":{"rendered":"To engage China, or balance it? Lessons from a failed grand strategic exercise"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><a href=\"https:\/\/testblogs.griffith.edu.au\/asiainsights\/tag\/peter-layton\/\">PETER LAYTON<\/a>\u00a0|<\/p>\n<p>How should a great power manage a rival with an authoritarian government, a state-directed capitalist economy, strong mercantilist tendencies and a \u201cleader for life\u201d that exploited a \u201ccult of personality?\u201d To make matters more difficult, this country\u2019s government dominates society through an all-pervasive party structure that stresses nationalism and argues that only the party can reverse recent slights and return the nation to its rightful place in the sun. This might sound like modern-day China, but in fact it is 1930s Germany.<\/p>\n<p>Early in the decade, Britain was a great power intent on maintaining the status quo. The\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.amazon.com\/Politics-Crisis-Interpretation-British-1931-1945\/dp\/1349405922\">Foreign Office observed<\/a>: \u201cWe have got all that we want, perhaps more. Our sole object is to keep what we have and live in peace.\u201d Japan, Italy, and Germany, though, were starting to pose troubling security problems. With resource limitations constraining their options, British policymakers in early 1934 decided to focus on Germany as the nation of primary concern and accordingly embraced a grand strategy that combined engagement and balancing. (For a fuller account, see my book\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.amazon.com\/Grand-Strategy-Peter-Layton\/dp\/0648279308\"><em>Grand Strategy<\/em><\/a>.)<\/p>\n<p>I should note that this article uses present-day terminology, which is not necessarily the same as that used in the 1930s. For example, it was not until the 1980s that the term \u201cgrand strategy\u201d began to be used to describe the coordinated diplomatic, military, and economic policies the British government adopted in the 1930s; one of the first to use the term was\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.jstor.org\/stable\/20096833?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents\">Paul Kennedy<\/a>. Similarly, in the 1930s, the terms \u201cconciliation\u201d and \u201crearmament\u201d were used rather than \u201cengagement\u201d and \u201cbalancing.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Please click here to read the full\u00a0\u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/warontherocks.com\/2018\/07\/to-engage-china-or-balance-it-lessons-from-a-failed-grand-strategic-exercise\/\">To engage China or balance it? Lessons from a failed grand strategic exercise<\/a>\u201d\u00a0article published at War on the Rocks,\u00a0written by Griffith Asia Institute Visiting Fellow, Dr Peter Layton.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>PETER LAYTON\u00a0| How should a great power manage a rival with an authoritarian government, a state-directed capitalist economy, strong mercantilist tendencies and a \u201cleader for life\u201d that exploited a \u201ccult of personality?\u201d To make matters more difficult, this country\u2019s government dominates society through an all-pervasive party structure that stresses nationalism and argues that only the [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":14,"featured_media":4578,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_dont_email_post_to_subs":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paywalled_content":false,"_jetpack_feature_clip_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":"","jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false},"categories":[233,245],"tags":[787,1082],"class_list":["post-4577","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-feature-series","category-china-and-north-east-asia","tag-grand-strategy","tag-peter-layton"],"acf":[],"modified_by":"Jill Moriarty","yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v28.0 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/product\/yoast-seo-wordpress\/ -->\n<title>To engage China, or balance it? 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As is customary, the\u00a0paradoxical nature\u00a0of war applies in that those impacted by a damaging strategy will over time devise optimised counter-moves. In general,\u00a0grey-zone activities\u00a0involve purposefully pursuing political objectives through carefully designed operations; moving cautiously\u2026","rel":"","context":"In &quot;Commentary&quot;","block_context":{"text":"Commentary","link":"https:\/\/testblogs.griffith.edu.au\/asiainsights\/category\/publication\/commentary\/"},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/testblogs.griffith.edu.au\/asiainsights\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2021\/10\/China-grey-zone2.jpg?resize=350%2C200&ssl=1","width":350,"height":200,"srcset":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/testblogs.griffith.edu.au\/asiainsights\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2021\/10\/China-grey-zone2.jpg?resize=350%2C200&ssl=1 1x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/testblogs.griffith.edu.au\/asiainsights\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2021\/10\/China-grey-zone2.jpg?resize=525%2C300&ssl=1 1.5x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/testblogs.griffith.edu.au\/asiainsights\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2021\/10\/China-grey-zone2.jpg?resize=700%2C400&ssl=1 2x"},"classes":[]},{"id":9989,"url":"https:\/\/testblogs.griffith.edu.au\/asiainsights\/duelling-battle-networks-the-new-equilibrium\/","url_meta":{"origin":4577,"position":1},"title":"Duelling battle networks: The new equilibrium","author":"Griffith Asia Institute","date":"21 September 2023","format":false,"excerpt":"PETER LAYTON | With digital technology omnipresent, future major wars will most likely pivot around duelling battle networks. These complicated systems represent unique target sets best attacked through using system of system thinking and emerging ideas of cognitive warfare. Particularly given China\u2019s \u201csystems confrontation\u201d focus, attacking battle networks is an\u2026","rel":"","context":"In &quot;Region | China and Northeast Asia&quot;","block_context":{"text":"Region | China and Northeast Asia","link":"https:\/\/testblogs.griffith.edu.au\/asiainsights\/category\/china-and-north-east-asia\/"},"img":{"alt_text":"Dark red technological map of the world with luminous dots, global information network on a digital screen","src":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/testblogs.griffith.edu.au\/asiainsights\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2023\/09\/Defence-technology-network.jpg?resize=350%2C200&ssl=1","width":350,"height":200,"srcset":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/testblogs.griffith.edu.au\/asiainsights\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2023\/09\/Defence-technology-network.jpg?resize=350%2C200&ssl=1 1x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/testblogs.griffith.edu.au\/asiainsights\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2023\/09\/Defence-technology-network.jpg?resize=525%2C300&ssl=1 1.5x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/testblogs.griffith.edu.au\/asiainsights\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2023\/09\/Defence-technology-network.jpg?resize=700%2C400&ssl=1 2x"},"classes":[]},{"id":4913,"url":"https:\/\/testblogs.griffith.edu.au\/asiainsights\/the-tenth-man-wars-changing-nature-in-an-ai-world\/","url_meta":{"origin":4577,"position":2},"title":"\u201cThe tenth man\u201d \u2014 War\u2019s changing nature in an AI world","author":"Griffith Asia Institute","date":"9 October 2018","format":false,"excerpt":"PETER LAYTON\u00a0| There\u2019s a debate underway about the\u00a0nature of war. Some say it\u2019s immutable, others say hogwash; ironically both sides quote Clausewitz for support. Interestingly,\u00a0Secretary of Defense Mattis, once an \u2018immutable\u2019 defender, has now\u00a0declared\u00a0he\u2019s not sure anymore, given recent\u00a0Artificial intelligence (AI)\u00a0\u00a0developments. At the core of the immutable case is the\u2026","rel":"","context":"In &quot;Feature series&quot;","block_context":{"text":"Feature series","link":"https:\/\/testblogs.griffith.edu.au\/asiainsights\/category\/publication\/feature-series\/"},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/testblogs.griffith.edu.au\/asiainsights\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2018\/10\/10th-man-900x500.jpg?resize=350%2C200&ssl=1","width":350,"height":200,"srcset":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/testblogs.griffith.edu.au\/asiainsights\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2018\/10\/10th-man-900x500.jpg?resize=350%2C200&ssl=1 1x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/testblogs.griffith.edu.au\/asiainsights\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2018\/10\/10th-man-900x500.jpg?resize=525%2C300&ssl=1 1.5x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/testblogs.griffith.edu.au\/asiainsights\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2018\/10\/10th-man-900x500.jpg?resize=700%2C400&ssl=1 2x"},"classes":[]},{"id":5662,"url":"https:\/\/testblogs.griffith.edu.au\/asiainsights\/prototype-warfare-in-the-fourth-industrial-age\/","url_meta":{"origin":4577,"position":3},"title":"Prototype warfare in the fourth industrial age","author":"Griffith Asia Institute","date":"4 April 2019","format":false,"excerpt":"PETER LAYTON\u00a0| A new industrial process is rapidly emerging.\u00a0 This fourth industrial revolution (4IR) based on hyper-connectivity brings with it both continual \u2013 indeed relentless \u2013 innovation and the possibility of practical large-scale prototype warfare. The interweaving of the second and third industrial revolutions is creating the fourth. This new\u2026","rel":"","context":"In &quot;Feature series&quot;","block_context":{"text":"Feature series","link":"https:\/\/testblogs.griffith.edu.au\/asiainsights\/category\/publication\/feature-series\/"},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/testblogs.griffith.edu.au\/asiainsights\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2019\/04\/Industry-4.0-900x500.jpg?resize=350%2C200&ssl=1","width":350,"height":200,"srcset":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/testblogs.griffith.edu.au\/asiainsights\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2019\/04\/Industry-4.0-900x500.jpg?resize=350%2C200&ssl=1 1x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/testblogs.griffith.edu.au\/asiainsights\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2019\/04\/Industry-4.0-900x500.jpg?resize=525%2C300&ssl=1 1.5x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/testblogs.griffith.edu.au\/asiainsights\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2019\/04\/Industry-4.0-900x500.jpg?resize=700%2C400&ssl=1 2x"},"classes":[]},{"id":5681,"url":"https:\/\/testblogs.griffith.edu.au\/asiainsights\/mobilising-defence-in-the-fourth-industrial-revolution\/","url_meta":{"origin":4577,"position":4},"title":"Mobilising Defence in the \u201cfourth industrial revolution\u201d","author":"Griffith Asia Institute","date":"19 April 2019","format":false,"excerpt":"PETER LAYTON\u00a0| Australia\u2019s future wars may not run to our timetable. Our recent wars of choice have allowed participation as and when we wished. If some future conflict is short notice however, the Australian Defence Force may lack the logistic backup to be more than a one-shot force, operationally viable\u2026","rel":"","context":"In &quot;Feature series&quot;","block_context":{"text":"Feature series","link":"https:\/\/testblogs.griffith.edu.au\/asiainsights\/category\/publication\/feature-series\/"},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/testblogs.griffith.edu.au\/asiainsights\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2019\/04\/4IR-3D-bomb-nose-fuse-900x500.jpg?resize=350%2C200&ssl=1","width":350,"height":200,"srcset":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/testblogs.griffith.edu.au\/asiainsights\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2019\/04\/4IR-3D-bomb-nose-fuse-900x500.jpg?resize=350%2C200&ssl=1 1x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/testblogs.griffith.edu.au\/asiainsights\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2019\/04\/4IR-3D-bomb-nose-fuse-900x500.jpg?resize=525%2C300&ssl=1 1.5x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/testblogs.griffith.edu.au\/asiainsights\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/2\/2019\/04\/4IR-3D-bomb-nose-fuse-900x500.jpg?resize=700%2C400&ssl=1 2x"},"classes":[]},{"id":10364,"url":"https:\/\/testblogs.griffith.edu.au\/asiainsights\/perspectivesasia-surviving-the-new-cold-war-as-a-middle-power\/","url_meta":{"origin":4577,"position":5},"title":"Perspectives:Asia | Surviving the new cold war as a middle power","author":"Griffith Asia Institute","date":"9 March 2023","format":false,"excerpt":"https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=sQdLsEG1VeQ PERSPECTIVES:ASIA\u00a0|\u00a0PETER K LEE\u00a0| In the evolving landscape of the Indo-Pacific, middle powers such as Australia are confronted with increasingly complex choices between the United States and China. This new Cold War presents unique challenges and opportunities, and Australia, once navigating a different geopolitical reality, now finds itself among a\u2026","rel":"","context":"In &quot;Event - Perspectives:Asia&quot;","block_context":{"text":"Event - Perspectives:Asia","link":"https:\/\/testblogs.griffith.edu.au\/asiainsights\/category\/events\/perspectives-asia\/"},"img":{"alt_text":"(L-R) Professor Ian Hall, Acting Director, Griffith Asia Institute, Griffith University, Dr Peter K Lee, Research Fellow in the Foreign Policy and Defence Program at the United States Studies Centre and Korea Foundation Research Fellow at the University of Melbourne\u2019s Asia Institute and Tarun Nagesh, Curatorial Manager, Asian and Pacific Art at QAGOMA. 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