{"id":5873,"date":"2019-06-03T12:00:44","date_gmt":"2019-06-03T02:00:44","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/testblogs.griffith.edu.au\/asiainsights\/?p=5873"},"modified":"2019-06-03T11:15:20","modified_gmt":"2019-06-03T01:15:20","slug":"japan-from-heisei-to-reiwa","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/testblogs.griffith.edu.au\/asiainsights\/japan-from-heisei-to-reiwa\/","title":{"rendered":"Japan: From Heisei to Reiwa"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><span style=\"color: #333333\"><b>Last week,\u00a0Bruce Miller AO, Australia&#8217;s former Ambassador to Japan\u00a0delivered our\u00a0<i>Perspectives: Asia<\/i>\u00a0seminar\u00a0reflecting on Japan&#8217;s\u00a0recent imperial transition, and the significance of the shift from the\u00a0Heisei\u00a0to to Reiwa era for contemporary Japan. There is\u00a0much to be gleaned from this speech about the nature of contemporary Japanese society,\u00a0Japan&#8217;s regional\u00a0aspirations and indeed\u00a0prospects for\u00a0strengthening\u00a0Australia&#8217;s relationship with\u00a0Japan\u00a0into the future. With Bruce&#8217;s permission we are delighted to share it\u00a0here.\u00a0<\/b><\/span><\/p>\n<p>I begin by congratulating the Griffith Asia Institute for the top class contribution it\u00a0makes to understanding Asia. And I thank the Centre for the invitation to speak this\u00a0evening on the transition in Japan from Heisei to Reiwa.<\/p>\n<p>I acknowledge also Consul-General Tanaka, whom I have known for 25 years.\u00a0I offer observations on the imperial transition and on contemporary Japan. I will do<br \/>\nthis in two halves. I will first speak about the imperial institution and its role, both in\u00a0historical context and in the context of Japan\u2019s post-war constitutional traditions. I\u00a0then speak more broadly about the likely direction of Japan in the new era. I will also,\u00a0if we have time, make some comments on the Australia Japan relationship.<\/p>\n<p>I do so from the perspective of someone, thanks to the positions I\u2019ve held, has had a\u00a041 year association with Japan, lived there for 16 years, and developed what I would\u00a0call an on-the-job understanding of the country, its language, history, culture, politics\u00a0and economy. It is not a life spent in deep academic reflection, perhaps\u00a0unfortunately, but rather engaging in diplomacy to pursue Australia\u2019s national\u00a0interests, so it is a particular perspective. It is also a personal perspective and does\u00a0not represent a government view, as I left the public service in December 2017.<\/p>\n<p>Seen from Australia, what does the transition mean? Views range from those arguing\u00a0that it is quaint, fascinating but meaningless; others that the shift in era will amount to\u00a0a massive change in the Japanese psyche.<\/p>\n<p>My answer lies somewhere in between. My argument is that the imperial institution,\u00a0while deeply rooted in Japan\u2019s traditions, is an integral part of Japan\u2019s more recent\u00a0but well entrenched democracy, and has shown flexibility as it has evolved over time.\u00a0I also argue that the new Reiwa era will reflect modern Japan as it evolves, rather\u00a0than determine how it evolves.<\/p>\n<p>The Emperor has less of a political role than other comparable constitutional\u00a0monarchs or heads of state. His formal political powers are non-existent. Unlike, for\u00a0example, the Queen in Britain or the Governor-General in Australia, who have\u00a0residual powers, admittedly rarely exercised, to select a prime minister should there\u00a0be doubt about an election outcome, the Emperor has no discretion at all in the\u00a0appointment of the Prime Minister.<\/p>\n<p>The Prime Minister is chosen by majority vote on the floor of both houses of the Diet\u00a0(the Japanese Parliament), with the lower house prevailing in the event of\u00a0disagreement. Only then, once selected, does the Emperor preside over an Attestation\u00a0Ceremony, that recognises the reality that the Diet has chosen a prime minister.\u00a0Under the postwar Constitution, the Emperor is defined as the symbol of the unity of\u00a0the Japanese people, not the head of state. Emperors since 1945, starting with\u00a0Hirohito part-way through his reign, Akihito and now Naruhito, take very seriously\u00a0the role of symbol.<\/p>\n<p>The Emperor as symbol isn\u2019t quite the post-war novelty it is made out to be. Nor did\u00a0the so-called divinity of the Emperor pre-1945 have quite the long pedigree it was\u00a0supposed to have had. The modern role of symbol has been grafted on to a tradition\u00a0of the emperors having almost no actual power but a great deal of prestige, that has\u00a0lasted almost all of the last thousand years. Before that, emperors did have political\u00a0power, but from the mid-Heian period on, such emperors were the rare exception\u00a0rather than the rule.<\/p>\n<p>The institution built on its religious functions and its cultural prestige through most of\u00a0this period. It then shifted it to an enhanced sacred or so-called divine status from the\u00a0late nineteenth century until 1945, and since then as a symbol, and now a wellentrenched\u00a0as part of Japan\u2019s democracy.<\/p>\n<p>Distinct from his constitutional role, the Emperor has a religious function as, in\u00a0effect, the chief Shint\u014d priest. This is not without controversy, because of the postwar\u00a0constitution\u2019s strict separation between religion and state, that sought to avoid the\u00a0perceived excesses of the nation-wide and standardised State Shint\u014d cult fostered by\u00a0the Meiji government.<\/p>\n<p>The emperor performs his state functions largely in the public eye, but his religious\u00a0ones with much less public focus. It is only in the last few years that we have seen\u00a0footage of the Emperor\u2019s visits to the Ky\u016bch\u016b Sanden \uff08\u5bae\u4e2d\u4e09\u6bbf\uff09shrine, located\u00a0on the grounds of the Imperial Palace which houses Shint\u014d deities and the spirits of\u00a0previous emperors.<\/p>\n<p>Arguably, the onerous demands of the religious calendar are one of the reasons for\u00a0the abdication, as the Emperor was not able to delegate any of these functions. He is\u00a0essential to ritual. Contrast the British Queen, who while head of the Church of\u00a0England, isn\u2019t essential to ritual.<\/p>\n<p>Notable too is the Imperial Family\u2019s guardianship of much traditional culture. I could\u00a0write a book on this, but let me give one example. The Utakai hajime\uff08\u6b4c\u4f1a\u59cb\u306e\u00a0\u5100\uff09or Annual New Year\u2019s Poetry Reading at the Palace in January, is presided over\u00a0by the Emperor and Empress, and attended by the Imperial Family. Six ambassadors\u00a0are allowed to attend every year, and I was lucky enough to do so in 2013.<\/p>\n<p>Poems composed by each member of the Imperial Family, and by a small group of\u00a0others selected nationwide, including schoolchildren, to a set theme that changes each\u00a0year, are chanted aloud. It is a hauntingly beautiful event, at which a tradition that\u00a0has been around for about 1500 years is on display, and is still under the patronage of\u00a0the Imperial Family. It attracts considerable popular interest, as about 5 million\u00a0people are actively involved in poetry writing in Japan.<\/p>\n<p>But the most prominent role for the imperial family in recent decades has been that of\u00a0consoling the Japanese people at times of calamity, as we saw after the 11 March\u00a02011 earthquake and tsunami. Emperor Akihito and Empress Michiko, and now\u00a0Emperor Naruhito and Empress Masako have devoted a great deal of time to this.\u00a0And it is the role of the imperial institution with which the Japanese people are now\u00a0most familiar.<\/p>\n<p>Drawing almost as much attention as the abdication and accession of the Emperors,\u00a0Japan has been transfixed by the announcement of the new era name, its meaning and\u00a0etymology, and by a wave of nostalgia as Emperor Akihito and Empress Michiko\u00a0carried out their last official duties before the abdication took effect on 30 April.\u00a0Era names up until Meiji would change repeatedly under the one Emperor, depending\u00a0on national fortunes and political whims of the time. It is only since 1868 that we see\u00a0one reign name per emperor.<\/p>\n<p>The two characters for Reiwa \uff08\u4ee4\u548c\uff09are taken separately from the prose preface to\u00a0a group of poems about plum blossom from the earliest collection of Japanese\u00a0language court poetry, the Man\u2019y\u014dsh\u016b. Not that it is relevant, but I was delighted at\u00a0the choice, as that collection has always been one of my favourites. Let\u2019s not forget\u00a0too that there are two plum trees, not cherry trees, planted in the stark minimalist\u00a0courtyard of the Imperial Palace.<\/p>\n<p>The international coverage of the new reign name was a little misguided, although it\u00a0is a complicated story. Much has been made of the choice of the earliest Japanese\u00a0language poetry collection as the source of the new reign name, and not the Chinese\u00a0classics. Roughly speaking, it is the difference between using Latin and English and\u00a0does not reflect a geo-political point. What is more, the prose section of the\u00a0Man\u2019y\u014dsh\u016b from which the characters are drawn was written in classical Chinese, and\u00a0it is only in the editions of more recent centuries that these have been translated into\u00a0classical Japanese.<\/p>\n<p>We see also criticism of the choice of the Man\u2019y\u014dsh\u016b because some of its poems were\u00a0drawn on during the Second World War for nationalist propaganda. This is unfair.\u00a0The Man\u2019y\u014dsh\u016b is best described as a collection of poetry diverse in content, and\u00a0including poems authored by ordinary people, such as border guards pining for home,\u00a0as well as court nobles.<\/p>\n<p>I was in Japan during the transition. It was interesting for what it showed about Japan,\u00a0both at the official level and among the public.<\/p>\n<p>Notable were the statements made by the Emperor on abdication, and the new\u00a0Emperor on accession, which emphasised their commitment to the peace constitution,\u00a0and their role as symbol of the unity of the Japanese people and in contributing to\u00a0Japan\u2019s international relations.<\/p>\n<p>We could see also that debates about separation of state and religion are still there,\u00a0including over what parts of the accession ceremonies should be funded by the\u00a0government. This will continue to be an uneasy point of friction in Japanese society.\u00a0Most interesting was the way in which it gave Japanese a prompt to reflect, at length,\u00a0on the last 30 years.<\/p>\n<p>Everyone I know spoke of where they fitted. Those like me who straddled three eras,\u00a0of Sh\u014dwa, Heisei and now Reiwa. Those under 30 who for the first time were\u00a0experiencing a transition. And of course, those few people still alive &#8211; you have to be\u00a0107 to achieve it &#8211; who have lived through the tail end of Meiji, Taish\u014d, Sh\u014dwa,\u00a0Heisei and Reiwa. Several were interviewed on television. A reminder that the\u00a0Japanese have the longest life expectancy in the world.<\/p>\n<p>What does it all mean? Certainly, Japanese people define themselves in terms of the\u00a0era names. People born in the 40 year of Sh\u014dwa speak of sharing the same musical\u00a0taste. It does differ from our habit in the English speaking world where people are\u00a0identified as being of the Georgian, Victorian and Edwardian eras only well after\u00a0those reigns had ended.<br \/>\nThe eras mark the passage of time for the country, as well as for individuals.<\/p>\n<p>Meiji (1868-1912) was about opening up to and catching up with the West, as well as\u00a0establishing a constitutional government and some aspects of representative\u00a0democracy, at the same time as developing imperial ambitions, sadly, also an aspect\u00a0of imitating the West.<\/p>\n<p>Taish\u014d (1912-1926) was known for its more liberal spirit, and a strengthening of\u00a0democratic institutions, but still without a universal franchise.<\/p>\n<p>The first 25 years of Sh\u014dwa (1926-1989), as we all know, saw military over-reach,\u00a0the loss of civilian control, and a catastrophic series of wars, followed by the allied\u00a0occupation. The second part of Sh\u014dwa, the next nearly 40 years, saw Japan accept a\u00a0new constitution, regain its sovereignty, entrench its democracy and recover\u00a0economically.<\/p>\n<p>Then Heisei (1989-2019) saw the collapse of the bubble economy, followed by years\u00a0of low growth, and, toward the end, efforts to revitalise Japan\u2019s economy and society.\u00a0But we can get carried away. Neither the era name nor the emperors determined the\u00a0evolution of Japan in any of those periods. Era names came to be shorthand\u00a0references to the mood of the time, and to reflect Japanese history in retrospect.<\/p>\n<p>The transition raised again the question of the succession. This is a sensitive matter.\u00a0Only males, and only through the patrilineal line, are eligible. But opinion polling<br \/>\nreveals that 80 percent of the Japanese population support a woman inheriting the\u00a0throne. And the abdication law explicitly provides for a discussion of options for\u00a0change. Whatever happens it won\u2019t happen overnight, and will be step-by-step.<\/p>\n<p>I was struck by the joyful atmosphere. Unlike previous transitions marked by the\u00a0death of the monarch, there was no sense of mourning, as the transition marked an\u00a0orderly transition, through abdication, for the first time in 202 years.\u00a0And for many Japanese there was a strong sense of nostalgia, as there was for me, as\u00a0the media covered all the popular cultural shifts of the last 30 years. Those of you\u00a0who know Japan, will know K\u014dhaku Uta Gassen \uff08\u7d05\u767d\u6b4c\u5408\u6226\uff09on New Year\u2019s\u00a0Eve, which brings together the popular cultural highlights of the year. We were\u00a0treated to highlights of the last 30 years of these.<\/p>\n<p>But the transition doesn\u2019t itself bring with it any big changes. Instead, we see\u00a0continuity in both Japan\u2019s imperial tradition and in its post-war constitutional\u00a0settlement, which have evolved together to mould the institution as it is today.\u00a0The emphasis placed by the two Emperors on their role as symbol, the careful\u00a0parliamentary deliberations over the abdication, the way in which the Emperor has\u00a0strengthened the role of the institution, such as through consoling the Japanese people\u00a0at times of disaster, show how the institution continues to evolve flexibly, albeit\u00a0slowly.<\/p>\n<p>The new era will see other changes. Prime Minister Abe will probably step down in\u00a02021 at the end of his third and final term as head of the ruling LDP, barring another\u00a0change in party rules allowing a fourth three-year term.<\/p>\n<p>It is worth looking briefly at the last ten years to examine the changes that have taken\u00a0place, and how sustainable they are.<\/p>\n<p>Japan has firmed up its defence posture in response to the rise of a stronger, often\u00a0assertive, on occasions aggressive, China. This started before Abe and will continue\u00a0after.<\/p>\n<p>This has included constitutional re-interpretation, increased defence expenditure and\u00a0streamlined national security decision-making. Japan still cannot do all that others\u00a0can on security and defence but it has more options available to it than it did. In a\u00a0departure from the past, constitutional reinterpretation means Japan can use military\u00a0force to aid other countries defend themselves against attack, not just defend itself, so\u00a0long as there is a direct threat to Japan as well.<\/p>\n<p>Striking too has been Japanese diplomacy, Prime Minister Abe\u2019s strong suit. He has\u00a0ably led his country navigating strong geo-political tides, and has deftly managed\u00a0major power relations with China, the United States, India, EU members and Russia.\u00a0He knew before anyone else the value of personal engagement with President Trump,\u00a0challenging though that can be. With China, he has held firm, not conceding any of\u00a0China\u2019s conditions for resumption of high level dialogue in 2015, but being\u00a0nonetheless willing to re-engage when China was ready. Not a bad model to pursue.\u00a0We see now a warming of Japan\u2019s relations with China, driven also by China\u2019s desire\u00a0to improve relations with its neighbours as its relations with the United States\u00a0worsen.<\/p>\n<p>He has dealt well with Australia, including each of our recent prime ministers, and\u00a0with India has strengthened relations with a partner not always easy to work with. He\u00a0is probably over ambitious for relations with Russia. I don\u2019t see settlement of the\u00a0territorial dispute any time soon, nor a peace treaty.<\/p>\n<p>Turning to the economy, most Japanese would say that he has done better at\u00a0diplomacy than at economic reform, although rate his stewardship as good enough.\u00a0By modern international standards, and admittedly they are quite low, the Japanese\u00a0government doesn\u2019t have a bad record. Every year there has been one signature\u00a0economic reform.<\/p>\n<p>We see significant trade liberalisation that would have been unthinkable in my earlier\u00a0years in Japan, starting with our Australia Japan FTA in 2014, then the TPP, and EUJapan.\u00a0Complementing these agreements, Japan has made progress in reforming its\u00a0hidebound agricultural sector which is being forced to turn its eyes to opportunities\u00a0for trading with the world.<\/p>\n<p>We see also some improvements in corporate governance, including more\u00a0independent board directors and a reduction in the infamous inter-locking corporate\u00a0shareholdings, which go some way to ameliorating the clubby atmosphere of\u00a0Japanese corporate life.<\/p>\n<p>And we see some progress on female participation in the workforce, including better\u00a0childcare, and, more importantly, the beginning of a discussion of the roles that both\u00a0parents should have in child-rearing, but still a long way to go.<\/p>\n<p>The Diet has passed into law a more organised programme of foreign labour mobility,\u00a0dare I call it immigration, although that isn\u2019t the terminology used by the Japanese\u00a0government. It is only a start, and we can criticise Japanese governments that it has\u00a0taken this long as demography doesn\u2019t move quickly.<\/p>\n<p>Notable too is how tourism promotion has driven regional revitalisation. I understand\u00a0too that it is local business interests in the regions who have been saying to the Prime\u00a0Minister and those around him that they need foreign labour to survive.\u00a0Prime Minister Abe will likely step down, barring rule changes, in 2021. He will\u00a0continue to be influential.<\/p>\n<p>He has been successful because the Japanese electorate saw him as the right man for\u00a0the times. It is less likely that he would have been able to mount a come-back, if\u00a0China\u2019s economic and military weight hadn\u2019t grown so much, and if China hadn\u2019t\u00a0adopted a relatively assertive posture toward Japan.<\/p>\n<p>He isn\u2019t all powerful. He has to persuade his own party, the broader Japanese system,\u00a0as well as the electorate, because of the Japanese preference for achieving consensus.\u00a0But PM Abe has been more willing than most to push change through once he has\u00a0achieved a critical mass of support, rather than waiting for full consensus.<\/p>\n<p>He isn\u2019t the conservative rightist he is portrayed as &#8211; it is a much more complex story.<\/p>\n<p>Yes, he has conservative beliefs, but he is pragmatic. A blinkered conservative rightist\u00a0wouldn\u2019t have entered into agricultural reform, trade liberalisation, let alone foreign\u00a0labour liberalisation or use the language of his 2015 apology on the 70th anniversary\u00a0of the end of the war. And I can also say that he is susceptible to influence and\u00a0persuasion.<\/p>\n<p>Will the achievements of this government be rolled back in the years to come, once\u00a0he steps down?<\/p>\n<p>Probably not. The strategic and economic changes started before Abe came to power\u00a0and will continue after. They are driven by necessity. The difference between Abe\u00a0and his predecessors lies in having political capital spare to make hard decisions that\u00a0had eluded previous governments.<\/p>\n<p>I will try my hand at a few predictions for the first five years of Reiwa.<\/p>\n<p>Will the Constitution be revised in any meaningful way to allow Japan to use military\u00a0force? On balance, I don\u2019t think it will. It would be a big risk to take to a popular\u00a0vote.<\/p>\n<p>But I also predict that the new legislative basis to Japan\u2019s security negotiated through\u00a0the Diet in 2015, allowing a much greater international security role, won\u2019t be rolled\u00a0back. Yes, there was opposition, but the secret of the success of the Japanese\u00a0government is that the LDP, already with diverse views internally on Japan\u2019s defence\u00a0and security policy, is in coalition with the K\u014dmeit\u014d, a pacifist party that delivers\u00a0many votes for LDP candidates. Together, the LDP and K\u014dmeit\u014d represent a broad\u00a0swathe of Japanese opinion, which suggests that what they have been able to agree\u00a0will survive the test of time in post-Abe Japan.<\/p>\n<p>Will foreign labour keep flowing in? Keeping the economy in good shape will\u00a0require Japan to sustain its progress in trade liberalisation, agricultural reform and\u00a0handling its demographic challenges by raising female workforce participation and\u00a0permitting foreign labour. The laws of supply and demand mean that foreign labour\u00a0is entering Japan in ever greater numbers, particularly from South-east Asia, China\u00a0and South Asia. It is not a question of whether foreign labour will enter Japan but\u00a0how socially inclusive Japan can be in dealing with them. I am less pessimistic here\u00a0than I used to be.<\/p>\n<p>Here sport has had a role to play &#8211; the composition of the Japanese rugby team, the\u00a0support for Naomi \u014csaka in tennis show an increasing willingness by Japan to\u00a0embrace a more diverse type of Japanese. But it will still take a lot of adjustment to\u00a0move from tolerating to accepting through to embracing foreign labour in Japan, and\u00a0it won\u2019t be easy.<\/p>\n<p>Will Japanese resume its dominant economic role in East Asia? No, Japan will not\u00a0again be the centre of the region\u2019s economy \u2013 a position it has been ceding to China\u00a0for some time. But Japan remains a major global economy, and a key enabler of\u00a0economic growth through investment, aid and technology. Japan\u2019s enormous stock of\u00a0overseas investment alone, which reached over $USD 1.47 trillion in 2017, ensures it\u00a0continues to wield great influence. Japanese companies still have vast reserves of\u00a0funds ready for investment both globally and domestically.<\/p>\n<p>Where these funds will go, however, is less certain. Yes, funds will follow returns\u00a0and reflect political and economic risk assessment. The direction they take will also\u00a0reflect economic growth prospects at home, which are in turn dependent on arresting\u00a0demographic decline, and continued economic reform. Abroad, pressure from President Trump to invest in the US will affect corporate investment decisions, as we\u00a0are seeing right now. And the US-China trade war is seeing a fall in the amount of\u00a0Japanese investment in manufacturing in China.<\/p>\n<p>But even as US trade policy throws up big challenges to global supply chains, they\u00a0will continue to be influenced by decisions made in boardrooms in Japan, amongst\u00a0others.<\/p>\n<p>Unlikely to change much are Japan\u2019s challenging strategic circumstances. Japan has\u00a0not only to grapple with Chinese assertiveness, and the threat posed by North Korea,\u00a0but also with growing US reluctance to exercise global leadership, which under\u00a0President Trump takes the form of raising doubts about US reliability.<\/p>\n<p>Unlikely to change too are Japan\u2019s high levels of social trust, low levels of crime, and\u00a0the quality of Japan\u2019s merchandise and service culture.\u00a0I conclude with a few short comments on Australia Japan relations.\u00a0Both Australia and Japan strongly support rules-based frameworks for trade,\u00a0investment, non-proliferation and dispute settlement. Both want flexible,\u00a0representative global institutions and a rules-based international framework to\u00a0support markets.<\/p>\n<p>The shifts in the balance of power affects Japan more pointedly than it does Australia,\u00a0and pushes our defence and security cooperation further, although we sometimes see\u00a0differences in threat perception.<\/p>\n<p>China and the United States in their different ways are challenging the existing rulesbased\u00a0frameworks, prompting Australia and Japan to work together more closely in\u00a0response to try to sustain that rules-based order. The United States withdrew from the\u00a0TPP but instead of the whole framework collapsing, which appeared likely, Japan and\u00a0Australia took the lead to keep it on foot as the TPP-11, without the US.<\/p>\n<p>Our history of stable and predictable bilateral corporate and government dealings will\u00a0see us turning ever more to one another in an age of growing uncertainty. As patterns\u00a0of global supply and demand change even more rapidly owing to technological\u00a0change and growth, producers will seek greater stability and predictability.<\/p>\n<p>As strong and important as Japanese investment in Australia already is, it will almost\u00a0certainly grow stronger. Japan pumped out a record $USD 160 billion in overseas\u00a0investment in 2017, second only to the US globally. This figure is four times that of\u00a015 years ago. A good chunk of this will keep coming to Australia. Our FTA also\u00a0created the conditions for easier Japanese investment in Australia.<\/p>\n<p>Bilateral ties will remain important to both countries, for economic and strategic\u00a0reasons, and be well anchored in our people-to-people links.<\/p>\n<p>I\u2019ve cantered through three big topics. My message is that Japan is, slowly but\u00a0effectively, adapting to the challenges it faces, and the evolution of the imperial\u00a0institution is one example of that.<\/p>\n<p>I hope I have provided something for everyone but quite possibly I have satisfied\u00a0nobody. I am happy to take questions.<\/p>\n<div class=\"label author\">AUTHOR<\/div>\n<p class=\"author-bio\"><strong>Bruce Miller AO<\/strong> former Ambassador to Japan 2011-17<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Last week,\u00a0Bruce Miller AO, Australia&#8217;s former Ambassador to Japan\u00a0delivered our\u00a0Perspectives: Asia\u00a0seminar\u00a0reflecting on Japan&#8217;s\u00a0recent imperial transition, and the significance of the shift from the\u00a0Heisei\u00a0to to Reiwa era for contemporary Japan. There is\u00a0much to be gleaned from this speech about the nature of contemporary Japanese society,\u00a0Japan&#8217;s regional\u00a0aspirations and indeed\u00a0prospects for\u00a0strengthening\u00a0Australia&#8217;s relationship with\u00a0Japan\u00a0into the future. With Bruce&#8217;s permission<a href=\"https:\/\/testblogs.griffith.edu.au\/asiainsights\/japan-from-heisei-to-reiwa\/\">Continue reading <span class=\"sr-only\">&#8220;Japan: From Heisei to Reiwa&#8221;<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":42,"featured_media":5879,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[233,245],"tags":[966,353,378,967],"class_list":["post-5873","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-feature-series","category-china-and-north-east-asia","tag-heisi","tag-japan","tag-perspectivesasia","tag-reiwa"],"acf":[],"modified_by":"Jill Moriarty","yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v21.6 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/wordpress\/plugins\/seo\/ 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