{"id":7226,"date":"2020-05-06T17:00:00","date_gmt":"2020-05-06T07:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/testblogs.griffith.edu.au\/asiainsights\/?p=7226"},"modified":"2020-05-07T05:52:20","modified_gmt":"2020-05-06T19:52:20","slug":"the-quality-of-authoritarian-rule-in-southeast-asia","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/testblogs.griffith.edu.au\/asiainsights\/the-quality-of-authoritarian-rule-in-southeast-asia\/","title":{"rendered":"The quality of authoritarian rule in South East Asia"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Authoritarian rule has long been a mainstay of political\nlife in Southeast Asia. Since most countries gained independence between the\n1940s and 1960s, a string of personalist dictators, military juntas, royal\nfamilies and single parties have flourished and faltered in the region. The\nvery familiarity of authoritarian rule, however, has tended to promote\nambiguity about whether that rule has actually changed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In The Rise of Sophisticated Authoritarianism in Southeast Asia<\/a><\/em>, I build a new theory and utilise a new dataset to describe how authoritarian rule in the region has evolved. I show:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

  1. It is possible to distinguish between\n\u2018retrograde\u2019 and \u2018sophisticated\u2019 forms of authoritarian rule <\/li>
  2. There is extraordinary variation in the quality\nof authoritarian rule both across and within countries<\/li>
  3. The quality of authoritarian rule ebbs and flows\n\u2013 sophisticated authoritarianism is not a natural end point on some linear\npathway<\/li>
  4. There is an alarming trend towards more\nsophisticated authoritarianism in the region<\/li><\/ol>\n\n\n\n

    1. It is possible to distinguish between \u2018retrograde\u2019 and\n\u2018sophisticated\u2019 forms of authoritarian rule<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

    My approach places authoritarian regimes on a scale ranging\nfrom retrograde (0) to sophisticated (100). The score reflects how closely those\nin power mimic the fundamental attributes of a democracy, whilst still reconciling\nthe known advantages, benefits and dividends of authoritarian politics. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    A hypothetical pure \u201cretrograde\u201d regime with a score of 0 is\none which completely<\/em> fails to mimic any democratic attributes, while\nalso practicing the known worst<\/em> form of authoritarian rule. It might for\nexample: forbid all elections, openly assassinate opponents, censor all forms\nof communication, deprive citizens of necessities and be the target of criticism\nfrom the United Nations Security Council. Myanmar in 1989 is a close example. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    A hypothetical pure \u201csophisticated\u201d regime with a score of\n100 is one in which completely<\/em> succeeds in mimicking democratic\nattributes, while also practicing the known best<\/em> form of authoritarian\nrule. It would for example: permit competitive elections, co-opt opponents into\nthe governing apparatus, promote self-censorship, provide citizens with a healthcare\nand avoid any criticism from the United Nations Security Council. Singapore in\nthe early 2010s is a fine example.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Between retrograde and sophisticated authoritarianism, neither\nform is preferential for citizens. The former is less democratic and\npotentially less stable; while the latter is nominally more democratic but more\nstable. Everyday life under a highly sophisticated regime would be superior.\nBut you would have much less hope of being truly free. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    2. There\u2019s extraordinary variation in the quality of\nauthoritarian rule both across and within countries<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

    I give 9 authoritarian regimes in Southeast Asia a score\neach year from 1975 to 2015. As of 2015, the scores for the nine remaining\nauthoritarian regimes were:<\/p>\n\n\n\n