{"id":7245,"date":"2020-05-11T09:00:00","date_gmt":"2020-05-10T23:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/testblogs.griffith.edu.au\/asiainsights\/?p=7245"},"modified":"2023-03-10T13:59:21","modified_gmt":"2023-03-10T03:59:21","slug":"time-to-get-serious-about-support-for-the-least-developed-countries-in-the-pacific","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/testblogs.griffith.edu.au\/asiainsights\/time-to-get-serious-about-support-for-the-least-developed-countries-in-the-pacific\/","title":{"rendered":"Time to get serious about support for the Pacific\u2019s least developed countries"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Until early this year the Pacific islands were\na rare ray of sunshine for the international development system. The region\u2019s four\nleast developed countries (LDCs) were first of a dozen countries worldwide scheduled\nto leave the UN category for the most vulnerable low income states.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Led by Vanuatu, which is scheduled to\ngraduate in December 2020, these countries benefited from years of relative\nregime stability, tourism growth and solid health and education policies. Solomon\nIslands is scheduled to graduate in 2024. Kiribati and Tuvalu also meet the\ncriteria. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Covid-19 has thrown a shadow across the region,\ncutting off the tourism on which most rely. Restrictions on movement have\ndisrupted domestic activity. The collapse in the world economy has slashed demand\nfor exports and forced foreign workers to go home. Global financial calamity\nthreatens, as countries in and outside the region struggle to pay their debts. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

In early April yet another tropical cyclone\nhit agriculture and rural communities in Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

A poor run of luck? A \u2018black swan<\/a>\u2019 \u2013 the\nterm coined by the philosopher Nassim Nicholas Taleb for unknowable high-impact\nevents \u2013 compounded by unlucky weather? <\/p>\n\n\n\n

In a paper\npublished last month<\/a> by the Commonwealth Secretariat in London, I argue that\nvulnerability is an inherent and functional feature of the existing global order.\nThe international community could do much more to support LDCs. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Vulnerability is the norm for these\ncountries. The way the global economy and climate are currently (dis)organised<\/a>,\nperipheral countries will always be exposed to shocks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Pacific island countries, like others\non the global margins, have in the past couple of decades fallen foul of a\nseries of crises that began in the rich world. They included the dotcom crash,\nan eight year commodity boom that led to huge price increases for imported\nitems such as gasoline and food, a subsequent collapse, resurgence and then\neven deeper trough in 2016. The global financial crisis in 2008 hit LDCs more\nthan most and small island developing states worst of all, as export demand and\ntourism slowed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The rich world\u2019s carbon addiction has played\nout particularly badly for the Pacific as, on top of sea level rise and the\nperiodic plunder of their natural assets by multinationals, a series of climate\ncataclysms culminated in cyclone Pam in 2015. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

According to the official UN measure of\nvulnerability, 20 of the 47 LDCs worldwide became more vulnerable between 2015\nand 2018.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Covid is only the latest in this\nnightmarish helter-skelter. The pandemic was no black swan. It was entirely\nknowable and could have been prepared for: health experts warned for years that\nhealth scares were worsening in the wake of bird \u2018flu, SARS and MERS. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

But global leadership is lacking and the\nsystem isn\u2019t set up to prevent crises. One of the best things that the rich\nworld could do for LDCs is get its own house in order, clamping down on the\nbehaviour that leads to worsening global health and economic crises. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

But wealthy countries could do much more directly\nfor the least developed. There are three types of help for LDCs: market access,\naid, and assistance with taking part in the international system.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The main benefit for LDCs is that in most\nmarkets they pay no taxes on exports or restrictions on how much can be sent abroad.\n<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But Pacific island LDCs don\u2019t export many\ngoods. And exports don\u2019t respond magically to falling trade barriers anyway \u2013\nthey depend on domestic\nproductive capacity<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Another support for LDCs is that official\ndonors commit to send them certain amounts of development assistance. While aid\nper head to Pacific LDCs is among the highest in the world, most donor states fail\nto meet their pledges<\/a>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

LDC governments also benefit from a series\nof other small advantages like free travel to some international meetings and\nlower payments to the UN budget. All good stuff, but small beer alongside the\nregular and worsening catastrophes raining down on the region.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In my paper<\/a>\nI argue that while this support is welcome, it\u2019s time to think bigger \u2013\nparticularly about economic instability and its impact on the most vulnerable.\nSystemic change is needed at the multilateral level, with measures to\ncoordinate global markets and better coordination at the UN. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The paper argues for a series of around 30 support\nmechanisms, covering finance and investment, trade, commodities and resource\nextraction, technology, climate breakdown and the environment. These measures need\nto be part of an ecosystem led by LDCs, not offered willy-nilly at the whim of the\npowerful.<\/p>\n\n\n\n