ELIZABETH BUCHANAN | <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Writing on current geopolitical affairs, let alone trying to predict what 125,000 Russian troops will do tomorrow, is a challenge. Void of an ability to look inside the Kremlin\u2019s \u201cblack box\u201d of policymaking, and in lieu of a direct line to Vladimir Putin, most of us (led by the Twittersphere) are desperately seeking to make sense of the strategic fog amassing over Ukraine. Given that these current tensions began with Moscow\u2019s provocations in 2014, why now is Russia increasing military pressure on Ukraine? Which in turn begs the bigger question: what strategic opportunity is Putin\u2019s Russia chasing right now?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Despite Australia\u2019s island-nation geography and strategic culture, Australia is not isolated from Russia\u2019s latest strategic play. While Australia is over 10,000 kilometres from Russia, any student of international relations knows distance matters very little in our hyper-globalised and deeply connected world. Yet, for most Australians, Russia remains essentially a \u201cEurope problem\u201d \u2012 locked in enduring competition with Washington.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In Soviet times, Moscow\u2019s footprint was closer to home, given the Red Navy\u2019s vast operations in the Indian Ocean. Go back further, to the 19th century, and colonial Australians were wracked with misguided fear of an impending Russian invasion<\/a> of the continent. Somewhat tragically, Australia\u2019s supply chain insecurity was also on show in the 1860\u2019s when a Russian ship, Svetlana,<\/em> arrived in Melbourne\u2019s Port Phillip Bay. She fired a cannon salute, but those ashore failed to reply in kind as the port was out of gunpowder.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Today, Russia takes a shadowy position as the (not so silent) backer of arms and energy in Australia\u2019s backyard. Attracted to the ethos of ASEAN\u2019s \u201cnon-interference\u201d principles, Russia has built robust ties throughout Southeast Asia. Militarily, Moscow enjoys a roaring arms trade throughout Australia\u2019s sphere of interest. Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam are key Russian arms clients. Canberra\u2019s coveted multilateral security bodies aren\u2019t out of reach for Russian arms \u2013 just look to the Quad. Since 2016, India has emerged as Russia\u2019s largest military arms customer. Delhi leases its nuclear submarines from Russia, which means India partakes in naval exercises with Australia using Russian hardware. The Quad, a key regional security forum, therefore runs partially on a Russian toolkit.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Across the Asia-Pacific energy sphere, Russia\u2019s footprint remains robust, and in some cases, is growing. Half of the Quad \u2013 Japan and India \u2013 import Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG). India and China are key stakeholders in Kremlin LNG projects along Russia\u2019s new energy frontier, the Russian Arctic. South Korea and Japan have long-held energy ties with Russia, are key Asian import markets for Russian LNG, and are stakeholders in Russian energy ventures. Russian-built nuclear power plants are proliferating throughout the region, including in China, India, and Bangladesh. Russia is also set to compete with Australia beyond LNG, given their mutual interest in exporting hydrogen.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Despite clear avenues of competition, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) characterises<\/a> the Australia-Russia bilateral relationship as a \u201cmature relationship\u201d which \u201callows us to confront our differences directly when necessary but work constructively where our interests intersect.\u201d Of course, it is a challenge to count on one hand where interests intersect.<\/em> Most recently, the DFAT approach to \u201cdirectly\u201d confronting differences was underscored by the 24 January 2022 decision to recall dependents of Australian Embassy staff in Kyiv, citing increased the threat posed by Russian troops amassing nearby.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Enter Ukraine<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n For the most part, focus and analysis on Ukraine fixates on who is to blame. Ukrainians argue little \u201cgreen men\u201d intervened following civil unrest and Kyiv\u2019s attempts to solidify ties with NATO, while the Russians claim they acted to protect persecuted Russian nationals in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in the east of Ukraine. Indeed, this is a Russian playbook of sorts we have already witnessed in Georgia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n If we stick to the facts of Ukraine, then three truths are relevant. First, Russia annexed Crimea from Ukraine in March 2014 \u2013 securing the coveted warm-water port at Sevastopol, delivering Moscow year-round maritime security. Second, Russian-supported forces have kept the eastern provinces of Ukraine destabilised enough to scare off any real <\/em>Western intervention or support. Third, there are over 125,000 Russian troops, armed to the teeth, sitting on the border staring down Europe.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But Ukraine is a proxy for Russia\u2019s bigger picture grievances with the West \u2013 primarily Washington. While many ruminate on tales of broken promises related to NATO eastward expansion (towards Russia), this won\u2019t solve the current security situation. In Ukraine, Moscow sees an opportunity to press Washington on Russia\u2019s long-held security interests in Europe. Russia has pinpointed some wriggle room in a domestically fragile US \u2013 divided at the seams on almost everything. Moscow has also noticed a European Union over-extended on Russian energy imports and at war with itself. To round out the strain on the West, Chinese growth economically and militarily has turbo-charged the international community\u2019s transition to a multipolar global order while necessitating a more \u201cpresent\u201d Washington in the Indo-Pacific. Europe might yet have to defend itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Putin\u2019s Russia thus sees an opportunity to force Washington back to a discussion on Europe\u2019s security architecture. We know full well the Russian interest here is an end-state where Washington \u201cexits\u201d Europe: a lofty ambition indeed. Tensions in Ukraine also coincide with the French presidency of the EU Council, and it is likely Moscow foresees, via French President Emmanuel Macron, a period of warmer Russia dialogue, and perhaps even an enhanced European interest in taking care of its own security. In less than a month, a French-presided EU Council has already heard various calls from Paris to re-establish dialogue with Moscow.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Ukraine, in the Big Picture<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n While Russia might vocalise demands for \u201clegally binding\u201d agreements that NATO will \u201cclose the door\u201d on admitting states like Ukraine and Georgia, Moscow\u2019s Ukraine strategy is about more than shoring up a more palatable European security architecture. Perhaps in the frenzy for \u201creading\u201d the Kremlin and following social media accounts of Russian military build-up in Ukraine, we miss the wood for the trees. Could this current show of strength be, in fact, a reflection of Russia\u2019s weakness?<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n Lashing out in fear of feeling encircled is not a new phenomenon for Russia. However, shifts in the security landscape appear to have sharpened Moscow\u2019s anxieties. Russia is losing control of its buffer zones, a traditional security blanket. Ukraine has long gravitated towards a US orbit, the Caucasus remains a tinderbox of extremist activity, and Kazakhstan is increasingly wedded to Beijing in lieu of Moscow.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Indeed, Russia has a history of rising and falling, growing and shrinking. Should this current use of force in Ukraine be a smokescreen for Russian insecurity, then the West must query the potential for a Russian implosion. If Putin removes his troops void of any substantial \u201cwin\u201d to present to Russian nationals, the state will need to further clamp down on civil society to hold power. It is unlikely this will end well for the Putin administration. Whether a replacement is primed and ready, let alone which direction Russia will head in, are questions we simply can\u2019t answer. However, policymakers should be considering the bigger picture: should Russia fail, what fills the vacuum? Who controls criminal trades through Central Asia? Who brokers discussions with Iran, Pakistan, and North Korea? What does all this mean for Australia? Hopefully, we are already considering such questions. This current European security crisis is much bigger than Ukraine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Dr Elizabeth Buchanan is an Adjunct Research Fellow at the Griffith Asia Institute.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n This article was first published at Australian Outlook<\/a>.<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
\n\n\n\n