Griffith UNIVERSITY

The Sydney Immigrant Survey

The Sydney Immigrant Survey

Final Technical Report

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Introduction

This technical report presents the methodology and data from the *Sydney Immigrant Survey*; a survey administered in 2018 and 2019 in Sydney, Australia. The data collection was undertaken as part of an Australian Research Council (ARC) Funded Project awarded to Professor Kristina Murphy, Associate Professor Adrian Cherney, Dr Elise Sargeant, and Professor Ben Bradford from Griffith University, the University of Queensland, and University College London, respectively[1]. Griffith University administered the Grant project. The title of the grant was: *Policing in a Multicultural Society: Is Procedural Justice the Answer?* (Grant Number DP170101149). The following sections of the report present the background literature informing the grant project, the aims of the project, and the methodology and summary of the findings obtained from the survey. The survey instrument that was used for the project is presented at the back of this report.

Background Literature

Community collaboration with police is essential for preventing crime and terrorism. Police rely heavily on the public to report victimisation, crime incidents, and even terror threats. However, people do not always want to engage with police, and police struggle to encourage some people to report crime and victimisation. This is especially so for new immigrants. Research finds that new immigrants can be less trusting of police and less willing to contact police if they have problems (Murphy 2013; Van Craen 2012).

Promoting immigrants' willingness to engage with police is important because new immigrants are over-represented in Australian victimisation statistics (AIFS 2014). Some immigrant groups also have more to contribute by way of terrorism-related intelligence. With crime and terrorism prevention costing the Australian authorities billions of dollars annually, understanding why immigrants can sometimes be reluctant to engage with police is crucial.

Police agencies and scholars globally have identified *procedural justice policing* as important for engaging communities (Mazerolle, Sargeant, Cherney, et al 2014; Tyler 2006). For example, in response to the 2014 Ferguson Race Riots in the USA, a *Presidential*

[1] We would like to thank Ms Harley Williamson for the Research Assistance she provided on this project. Ms Williamson is currently a PhD student at the School of Criminology & Criminal Justice at Griffith University.

Taskforce for 21st Century Policing in the USA recommended that public trust and confidence in police could be built if police utilise procedural justice when interacting with the community (Taskforce 2015). Procedural justice in policing refers to the quality of the interpersonal treatment people receive from police and the fairness of the procedures police use to make decisions (see Tyler 1990). Goodman-Delahunty (2010) noted there are four key ingredients required for procedural justice to be present in an interaction between police and citizen. These four ingredients are: *trustworthiness; respectful treatment; neutrality;* and *voice*. If people feel the police are trustworthy and have their best interests at heart, if they feel treated with dignity and respect by police, are given a 'voice' during police encounters, and are dealt with in an impartial manner by police, then the interaction will typically be judged as being procedurally just.

While the Taskforce's recommendation that police should use procedural justice in all interactions with the public sounds appealing, recent research challenges a dominant view in the literature that procedural justice always promotes trust and engagement with police. Findings show that procedural justice policing can have varying levels of success for different population groups and in different policing contexts. In some contexts, it can be counter-productive (Cherney & Murphy 2013; Murphy & Cherney 2011, Sargeant, Murphy & Cherney 2014). Such findings stand in contrast to most published studies in the procedural justice policing literature. They also demonstrate that little is known about the factors that promote or undermine police efforts to engage and build trust in communities. With procedural justice being increasingly recognised and adopted into police practice it is imperative to understand how different people and groups perceive or respond to procedural justice policing.

The *Sydney Immigrant Survey (SIS)* was developed to canvas first and second-generation immigrants' perceptions regarding police in Australia, to examine why some immigrants may disengage from the police, and to understand whether procedural justice policing promotes immigrants' willingness to report victimisation, crime and terrorism threats to police. The survey focused exclusively on three immigrant groups in Australia (UK/Irish immigrants; Vietnamese immigrants; Middle Eastern Muslim immigrants). One aim was to discern potential differences in their attitudes toward police and differences in their propensity to engage with police. Muslims from Middle Eastern countries were of particular interest to this research given the unique challenges they have faced in Australia since the War on Terror commenced in the early 2000s.

The survey specifically captured immigrants' attitudes to police, Australia and other groups in the population, and feelings about their perceived status in Australia (how they think others see them). Also measured in the survey were numerous identity questions which were designed to ascertain which identities are most important to immigrants. Further, immigrants' levels of resistance and disengagement toward police were measured, and how various identities can come under threat by police. Immigrants' perceptions of police use of procedural justice (both personal experience and general perceptions), and self-reported willingness to cooperate with police in two different policing contexts (crime vs terrorism prevention) were also measured.

The survey had four primary aims:

1. To understand why immigrants sometimes disengage from police.
2. To critically examine how immigrants perceive procedural justice policing.
3. To examine if procedural justice promotes immigrants' willingness to cooperate with police in both crime and terrorism prevention.
4. To examine if the procedural justice/cooperation relationship varies between the three immigrant groups, for first- and second-generation immigrants, and in different policing contexts (crime vs terrorism reporting).

This technical report is divided into four parts. Part 1 outlines the methodology of the Sydney Immigrant Survey, including the sampling strategy, response rates, sample representativeness, and an overview of the key concepts and how they were measured. Part 2 summarises the preliminary findings from the Sydney Immigrant Survey. Part 3 details the items used to construct the scales that represent each of the key concepts outlined in Part 2 of this report. Finally, Part 4 presents the codebook, which outlines all of the items in the survey, as well as a breakdown of participant responses to each question and any missing data for each item. Several appendices containing data from the survey are also presented.

Part 1: Survey Methodology

1.1 Overview of the Survey

The *Sydney Immigrant Survey (SIS)* contained 164 questions across 14 pages. Participants were contacted via telephone to arrange a face-to-face interview at a later date, and responses were recorded by a dedicated interviewer employed by *Cultural Partners Research and Marketing*. *Cultural Partners* was retained via a competitive tender process by the Research Team at Griffith University to undertake the administration of the survey. *Cultural Partners* is a Sydney-based company that specialises in recruiting participants from hard-to-reach audiences, such as culturally and linguistically diverse (CALD) communities. The company employs interviewers who are proficient in a number of languages. This ensures that target populations who do not speak English are represented in studies. Fieldwork for the *Sydney Immigrant Survey* was initially conducted between February and May 2018. This resulted in data from 903 immigrants. The survey was again fielded in March 2019 to replace 76 out-of-scope cases identified in the original dataset (n=17 Middle Eastern Muslim participants; n=59 Vietnamese participants).

The survey was designed to identify effective strategies police can use to improve relationships with three specific immigrant communities in Australia (UK/Irish, Vietnamese and Middle Eastern Muslim immigrants). A range of questions were included to gauge participants' attitudes towards crime and victimisation, as well as towards police agencies. The survey also incorporated questions regarding participants' identification with different groups in society, as well as their feelings of social inclusion within Australia. Finally, a range of demographic questions were included in the survey. There were five sections containing multiple questions in the survey. Each of the five sections of the Survey are discussed in Part 3 of this report, and the measurement of each section's constructs is also outlined in more depth in Part 3 of this report. Section 1 of the *Survey* measured different aspects of participants' demographic characteristics. Section 2 included questions about participants' self-reported identity and status in society. Section 3 contained a range of questions measuring participants' perceptions of social inclusion. Section 4 gauged the level of crime in participants' suburbs, as well as their experiences of victimisation within

Australia. Finally, Section 4 was designed to assess participants' views of the government and police agencies.

1.2 The Survey Sample: Sampling Strategy

A quota-based sampling strategy was utilised to attain the desired survey sample size of 900. One dedicated interview team comprising 6-8 interviewers from *Cultural Partners* was deployed to each of the three immigrant community cohorts (UK/Irish immigrants; Vietnamese Immigrants; Middle Eastern Muslim immigrants). To build trust and rapport among survey participants, interviewers in each of the three interview teams shared the target groups' ancestral background, or their religion for the Middle Eastern Muslim cohort. *Cultural Partners* was instructed to recruit immigrants aged 18 or older from the greater Sydney metropolitan area (see Appendix A for a map of the Greater Sydney region). Sydney was chosen because it contains the greatest number of immigrants from these three groups in Australia (ABS, 2016). To select the sample, all immigrants had to be citizens of Australia, and several demographic quotas were placed on the required sample for each immigrant group. These quotas included:

1) A gender quota (50% women; 50% men);
2) An age group quota (50% in the 18-29 age group; 50% in the 30+ age group); and
3) An immigrant status quota (50% 1st generation immigrants (i.e., overseas born); 50% 2nd generation immigrants (i.e., born in Australia, with at least one parent born overseas).

The three immigrant groups were chosen for several reasons. First, the UK/Irish immigrant sample served as a comparison group for the two other 'ethnic/racial minority' immigrant groups. Survey data from a UK/Irish immigrant sample seeks to shed light on how a non-ethnic/racial minority immigrant perceives and responds to police in Australia. The UK also shares many features in common with Australia, including its approach to policing.

Second, each of the three groups is likely to hold different expectations of police or have had different experiences with police in Australia. Immigrants from the Middle East and Vietnam were chosen because both have had difficult relationships with police in Australia. Both groups are also less trusting of police than other immigrant groups in Australia (see Cherney & Murphy, 2013; Sargeant et al., 2014).

Third, these three groups have a long-established pattern of migration to Australia. Hence, variation between first- and second-generation immigrants from the Middle East, Vietnam and the UK/Ireland can be assessed. This is important because previous research shows that immigrants' views of police can vary by time since first arrival in a new country (Bradford, Sargeant, Murphy & Jackson, 2016; Pass, 2018).

Fourth, research has also found differences in how immigrant groups respond to procedural justice policing. For example, a study utilising Vietnamese immigrants found they respond less strongly to procedural justice policing, while Muslims seem to value procedural justice a great deal (Cherney & Murphy, 2013; Sargeant et al., 2014).

Fifth, past research shows that Muslims of Middle Eastern origin feel like a suspect community and reporting feeling that their community is 'under-siege' due to the War on Terrorism. They also report being unfairly singled out by counter-terrorism policing and laws (Cherney & Murphy, 2013; 2015). These factors taken together generate a distinct experience unlike that of immigrants from the UK/Ireland or Vietnam and are likely to uniquely shape Muslims' perceptions of police and their willingness to engage and collaborate with police, particularly in the counter-terrorism context (Cherney & Murphy 2015). The Middle Eastern Muslim group, and to a lesser extent the Vietnamese or UK/Ireland groups, might also experience greater levels of identity threat from police, which may result in different reactions to procedural justice policing.

1.3 Survey Recruitment

A target sample size of 900 participants was set for the three immigrant communities. The original survey quotas set for each of the three immigrant communities were as follows:

- 180 participants from the UK and Ireland;
- 360 Vietnamese participants; and
- 360 Middle Eastern Muslim participants (see Appendix B for a map of all countries classified as being in the Middle East).

Normal random probability sampling techniques are inadequate when attempting to recruit small population groups. For example, according to the 2016 Australian Census, Muslim immigrants comprise only about 2.6% of Australia's population, and Vietnamese immigrants comprise approximately 1.2% of the Australian population (ABS 2016). As

such, a specific recruitment strategy was utilised to obtain the desired sample size for the Vietnamese and Middle Eastern Muslim samples. The recruitment strategy involved using an 'ethnic surname sampling strategy'. This sampling technique has been found to be statistically reliable and can produce representative samples, including in Australia (Himmelfarb, Loar and Mott, 1983; Murphy, Cherney, Wickes, Mazerolle & Sargeant, 2012; Murphy, Cherney & Barkworth, 2015).

The ethnic naming sampling strategy involved generating sample records (names and associated household telephone numbers) from the Australian Electronic White Pages (EWP) Telephone Directory in Sydney. An initial sampling frame was constructed containing 13,591 names generated at random from the EWP (7,477 for the Middle Eastern Muslim cohort; 6,114 for the Vietnamese cohort). Potential interview participants were then randomly contacted from these generated sample lists for the purposes of recruitment for face-to-face interviews. A next-birthday method was used to select a person over 18 living in the contacted household. To satisfy the ethnic, immigrant status, gender, and age quotas established for the project, a series of screening questions were also used to ensure the participant qualified as being from: (1) a Vietnamese or Middle Eastern Muslim background; and (2) identified as a first (overseas born) or second (born in Australia, but both parents born overseas) generation immigrant. The quotas for gender (50% female; 50% male) and age (50% < 30 years of age; 50% $\geq$ 30 years of age) were also applied to select the final sample. All interviews occurred in a public place.

The UK/Irish immigrant cohort sample could not be generated using the ethnic naming system recruitment method, so a more direct-to-market method was used. This strategy involved a range of recruitment strategies deployed to generate potential participants including via social and sporting club affiliations (e.g., football clubs), intercepts at local centres known to attract UK and Irish immigrants, social media (e.g., Facebook, Airtasker), recruitment agencies, and a small number of referrals (for boosting purposes). A total of 393 UK/Irish sample records were compiled into an aggregated list and participants were randomly contacted and recruited for face-to-face interviews using the same procedure outlined above for the Vietnamese and Middle Eastern Muslim cohorts. Again, all interviews occurred in a public place of the participants' choosing.

1.4 Survey Response

After survey fielding commenced in February 2018, Cultural Partners reported to the Research Team that they were having difficulty recruiting the desired sample from the UK/Irish cohort, despite immigrants from the UK/Ireland comprising the largest immigrant population in Australia (this is due to UK surnames being in common with many other countries). As such, the Research Team decided to reduce the final sample size in the UK/Irish cohort and increase the sample size in the other two immigrant groups. The final sample size (n=903) is split across the three immigrant groups as follows:

- 110 participants from the UK and Ireland;
- 395 Vietnamese participants;
- 398 Middle Eastern Muslim participants.

A total of 8,437 sample records were used to recruit the 903 participants who formed the initial sample in this study. For the purposes of this report, *response rates* were calculated as follows: those who agreed to participate in the study divided by the number of those who could be contacted from the sample list. The response rate for the Middle Eastern Muslim immigrants was 35.79%, for the Vietnamese immigrants it was 51.37%, and for the UK/Irish immigrants it was 80.88%. The averaged response rate across the three groups was 44.77%. Table 1 below outlines the response rates for each immigrant group.

Table 1 Response Rates from the *Sydney Immigrant Survey* – 2018 data collection

	Middle Eastern Muslims	Vietnamese	UK/Irish	Totals
Recruitment method	EWP	EWP	Direct to market	
Available records	7,477	6,114	393	13,984
Based used	4,636	3,468	333	8,437
Unusable	30.18%	25.6%	20.72%	
Out of scope	22.86%	24.12%	19.82%	
Unresolved	22.97%	28.11%	18.62%	
In scope	1,112 (23.98%)	769 (22.17%)	136 (40.84%)	2,017 (23.91%)
Interviews achieved	398	395	110	903
Response rate	35.79%	51.37%	80.88%	44.77%

Note: EWP = Electronic White Pages, using an ethnic naming system

After the initial data was analysed by the research team, it was determined that some of the cases collected in the survey were considered out-of-scope (i.e., the sample contained multiple people in one household; some of the Middle Eastern immigrants were not Muslim; five cases were younger than 18, etc). This was reported to Cultural Partners who undertook a review of all cases collected. It was determined that 76 out-of-scope surveys were identified in the Middle Eastern Muslim (N=17) and Vietnamese cohorts (N=59). These 76 out-of-scope cases were replaced with new survey respondents in a second wave of data collection that took place in March 2019. To collect survey data from these additional 76 cases, Cultural Partners had to first compile a list of additional names and phone numbers using the Electronic White Pages (N=346 cases for the Middle Eastern Muslim cohort; N=1,181 cases for the Vietnamese Cohort).

The survey findings reported in this technical report only use in-scope cases. The 76 out-of-scope cases were discarded. Table 2 presents the new response rates for the 903 in-scope survey respondents. The final response rates were as follows: Middle Eastern Muslim immigrants (34.85%), Vietnamese immigrants (45.04%) and UK/Irish immigrants (80.88%). The average final response rate across all three immigrant cohorts was 41.90%.

Table 2 Final Response Rates from the *Sydney Immigrant Survey*

	Middle Eastern Muslims	Vietnamese	UK/Irish	Totals
Recruitment method	EWP	EWP	Direct to market	
Available records	7,823	7,295	393	15,511
Based used	4,632	3,499	333	8,464
Unusable	29.00%	24.57%	20.72%	
Out of scope	23.25%	23.3%	19.82%	
Unresolved	23.88%	27.68%	18.62%	
In scope	1,142 (24.65%)	877 (25.06%)	136 (40.84%)	2,155 (25.46%)
Interviews achieved	398	395	110	903
Response rate	34.85%	45.04%	80.88%	41.90%

Note: EWP = Electronic White Pages, using an ethnic naming system.

1.5 Item Non-response

Given the face-to-face nature of the survey methodology, item non-response in the *Sydney Immigrant Survey* was very low. A missing data analysis was conducted and revealed that only two variables contained a significant amount of missing data (see Appendix C and Part 4 of this report for missing data analysis results for all survey questions). The two variables with substantial amounts of missing data are outlined in Table 3 below. Both questions were only answered if applicable to the participant. As such, it was anticipated that there would be a high rate of missing data for these two questions. No other survey question contained more than 1% missing data.

Table 3 Highest amount of Missing Data in the *Sydney Immigrant Survey*

Survey Question		Frequency Missing	% Missing
Q4	If you were born overseas, in which year did you first arrive in Australia to live?	465	51.5
Q23	If you have experienced being a victim of crime in Australia, was there an occasion where you DID NOT report the incident to police?	180	19.9

1.6 Sample Representativeness

The sampling method used for the *Sydney Immigrant Survey* utilised quotas to capture particular demographic characteristics within the three immigrant cohorts. As such, the final sample in each of the three immigrant cohorts was not expected to be representative of population figures for the three specific immigrant groups. Despite this expectation, the following tables provide an overview of the sample characteristics of each of the three immigrant groups collected in the *Survey* against the 2016 Census of Sydney's population for each of the three immigrant groups separately (see Appendix D for a detailed breakdown of how the three immigrant groups were defined in the Australian Census).

Some key demographic variables were compared with 2016 Australian census data. Table 4 highlights the difference in gender ratio between the survey and 2016 Australian census statistics across the three immigrant groups. There is a slight under-representation of males in the UK/Irish (by -4.0%) and Middle Eastern Muslim (-1.7%) groups. Males are

slightly over-represented in the Vietnamese sample by 3.8%. These differences can be attributed to the fact that one of the survey sample criterions was to recruit a sample population that was equally divided by male and female participants.

Table 4 Distribution of gender in the *Sydney Immigrant Survey*

Sample group	Sample proportion (%)			Census proportion (%)			Absolute difference		
	UK/ Irish	Middle Eastern Muslim	Vietnamese	UK/ Irish	Middle Eastern Muslim	Vietnamese	UK/ Irish	Middle Eastern Muslim	Vietnamese
Male	45.5	50.0	50.4	49.4	51.7	46.6	-4.0	-1.7	+3.8
Female	54.5	50.0	49.6	50.6	48.3	53.4	+3.9	+1.7	-3.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

When comparing the *Survey* sample to the age breakdown of 2016 Census data (filtered by each immigrant group), the survey sample differed from the age breakdown of each group in the Census (see Table 5). Among the UK/Irish participants, there was an over-representation of survey participants aged 25-29 (by 18.9%) and 30-34 (by 10.5%). Similar patterns are observable, albeit to a lesser extent, among the Middle Eastern Muslim and Vietnamese samples. Across all three cultural groups, participants aged over 45 years were slightly under-represented in the survey sample. Again, this was somewhat expected given the requirement to include 50% of the sample below the age of 30.

When comparing sample proportions of marital status from the Sydney Immigrant Survey with census data, there were also some differences in distributions. For example, among the UK/Irish sample, single participants were over-represented by 27.0%. Single participants were also over-represented in the Middle Eastern Muslim (by 26.4%) and Vietnamese (by 16.9%) samples. Married participants were under-represented by more than 10% in the UK/Irish (-11.2%) and Vietnamese (-9.2%) samples, while slightly over-represented in the Muslim sample (by 1.1%). Divorced and separated participants were under-represented across all three immigrant groups. These differences may also have been due to the fact that the sample contained 50% of people who were younger than 30. Table 6 presents the comparison between groups by marital status.

Table 5 Distribution of age groups in the *Sydney Immigrant Survey*

Sample group	Sample proportion (%)			Census proportion (%)			Absolute difference		
	UK/ Irish	Middle Eastern Muslim	Vietnamese	UK/ Irish	Middle Eastern Muslim	Vietnamese	UK/ Irish	Middle Eastern Muslim	Vietnamese
15-19	2.7	6.3	5.3	5.4	7.9	7.8	-2.7	-1.6	-2.5
20-24	12.7	18.6	18.5	5.9	7.9	9.7	+6.8	+10.8	+8.8
25-29	25.5	24.1	26.1	6.6	8.7	8.3	+18.9	+15.5	+17.8
30-34	17.3	16.6	14.9	6.8	9.4	8.2	+10.5	+7.0	+6.7
35-39	16.4	13.1	8.6	6.6	8.5	7.5	+9.8	+4.4	+1.1
40-44	13.6	7.8	5.3	7.3	6.9	7.8	6.3	+0.9	-2.5
45-49	5.5	3.8	3.5	7.3	6.0	7.4	-1.8	-2.2	-3.9
50-54	2.7	3.5	4.1	7.1	5.1	6.8	-4.4	-1.6	-2.7
55-59	0.9	2.8	4.6	6.8	3.9	7.1	-5.9	-1.1	-2.5
60-64	1.8	2.0	3.8	6.1	3.1	5.0	-4.3	-1.1	-1.2
65-69	0.9	0.5	1.8	5.7	2.5	2.8	-4.8	-2	-1.0
70-74	0.0	0.5	0.5	4.5	1.6	1.5	-4.5	-1.1	-1.0
75-79	0.0	0.0	1.0	3.1	0.9	1.0	-3.1	-0.9	+0.0
80-84	0.0	0.5	2.0	2.2	0.4	0.8	-2.2	+0.1	+1.2
85+	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.6	0.4	0.8	-1.6	-0.4	-0.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table 6 Distribution of marital status in the *Sydney Immigrant Survey*

Sample group	Sample proportion (%)			Census proportion (%)			Absolute difference		
	UK/ Irish	Middle Eastern Muslim	Vietnamese	UK/ Irish	Middle Eastern Muslim	Vietnamese	UK/ Irish	Middle Eastern Muslim	Vietnamese
Married	35.5	56.8	38.5	46.7	55.7	47.7	-11.2	+1.1	-9.2
Single	62.7	31.9	51.9	35.7	5.5	35.0	+27.0	+26.4	+16.9
Widowed	0.0	1.3	3.3	5.4	2.6	2.9	-5.4	-1.3	+0.4
Divorced or separated	1.8	10.1	6.3	12.2	12.3	14.4	-10.4	-2.2	-8.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

When examining country of birth among the survey immigrant groups, Australian-born participants who had UK/Irish ancestry were under-represented by more than one-third (-34.8%), while Australian-born Middle Eastern Muslim and Vietnamese participants were over-represented in the sample by 2.6% and 17.4%, respectively (see Table 7).

Finally, when examining differences in income between the three immigrant groups, there were large differences between low income and high-income earners. For example, low income earners (e.g., between $5,000 and $40,000 per year) in the UK/Irish sample were slightly over-represented, while in the Middle Eastern Muslim and Vietnamese samples they were under-represented. For all three immigrant groups, high income earners of $100,000 or more were significantly over-represented in the sample. Table 8 provides a breakdown of the differences in income level between survey participants and census data.

Table 7 Distribution of country of birth in the *Sydney Immigrant Survey*

Sample group	Sample proportion (%)			Census proportion (%)			Absolute difference		
	UK/ Irish	Middle Eastern Muslim	Vietnamese	UK/ Irish	Middle Eastern Muslim	Vietnamese	UK/ Irish	Middle Eastern Muslim	Vietnamese
Australia	42.7	50.5	50.1	79.1	48.1	32.5	-36.4	+2.4	+17.6
Overseas	57.3	49.5	49.9	20.1	51.9	67.5	+37.2	-2.4	-17.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table 8 Distribution of annual income ($'000s) in the *Sydney Immigrant Survey*

Sample group	Sample proportion (%)			Census proportion (%)			Absolute difference		
	UK/ Irish	Middle Eastern Muslim	Vietnamese	UK/ Irish	Middle Eastern Muslim	Vietnamese	UK	Middle Eastern Muslim	Vietnamese
$0	0.9	4.0	9.1	7.4	16.3	18.8	-6.5	-12.3	-9.7
$5[2]	0.0	0.5	0.3	3.9	5.7	5.3	-3.9	-5.2	-5.0
$10-15[3]	0.0	4.5	4.6	5.7	14.6	11.6	-5.7	-10.1	-7.0
$20[4]	0.0	3.8	3.5	7.3	13.8	11	-7.3	-10.0	-7.5
$25[5]	0.0	5.0	3.3	7.9	9.6	7.6	-7.9	-4.6	-4.3
$30[6]	2.7	4.0	3.8	7.4	8.2	7.0	-4.7	-4.2	-3.2
$35-40[7]	2.7	11.1	8.6	7.4	7.1	7.9	-4.7	+4.5	+0.7
$45-50[8]	3.6	12.8	12.2	8.6	6.5	8.4	-5.0	+6.3	+3.8
$55-65[9]	9.0	15.3	16.0	9.7	6.2	7.6	-0.7	+9.1	+8.4
$70-75[10]	10.9	9.8	8.6	7.3	3.8	4.7	+3.6	+6.0	+3.9
$80-90[11]	14.5	10.6	7.8	6.6	2.8	3.3	+7.9	+7.8	+4.5
$95-100[12]	8.2	6.6	3.3	5.0	1.8	2.2	+3.2	+4.8	+1.1
$105-150[13]	27.2	7.3	13.4	8.5	2.3	3.1	+18.7	+5.0	+10.3
$155+[14]	19.9	4.0	5.6	7.3	1.2	1.5	+12.6	+2.8	+4.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

[2] ABS category ranges from $1-$7,799
[3] ABS category ranges from $7,800-$15,599
[4] ABS category ranges from $15,600-$20,799
[5] ABS category ranges from $20,800-$25,999
[6] ABS category ranges from $26,000-$33,799
[7] ABS category ranges from $33,800-$41,599
[8] ABS category ranges from $41,600-$51,999
[9] ABS category ranges from $52,000-$64,999
[10] ABS category ranges from $65,000-$77,999
[11] ABS category ranges from $78,000-$90,999
[12] ABS category ranges from $91,000-$103,999
[13] ABS category ranges from $104,000-$155,999
[14] ABS category includes $156,000 or more

Part 2: Preliminary Survey Findings

Part 2 of this Technical Report presents some preliminary findings from the five sections of the *Sydney Immigrant Survey*. The results presented here are descriptive only and do not seek to make any generalised conclusions. More detailed analyses of the survey data will be conducted at a later date, and academic publications arising from the data will be forthcoming.

2.1 Section 1: Participant Background

The first section of the *Sydney Immigrant Survey* included demographic information about each participant. As can be seen in Table 9, 49.6% of the overall survey sample was male, while 50.4% was female. Participants ranged in age from 18-84, with the average age being 33.7 (*SD* = 12.9). All participants (100%) were Australian citizens and 49.5% said they were born in Australia. Survey participants were asked to specify their primary ancestry; 43.4% of the participants reported being of Vietnamese ancestry, 38.4% specified they were from Lebanese ancestry, and 11.9% specified they were of UK ancestry (i.e., Wales, England, Ireland, and Scotland). Appendix E provides a more detailed overview of participants' primary and secondary ancestries. Participants were also asked if they believed they spoke English well. Almost all participants responded 'Yes' (91.5%).

In terms of educational attainment, Table 9 shows almost a quarter of the total sample reported having completed a bachelor's degree (21.8%). Participants who completed Secondary school or a Diploma or Advanced Diploma represented 21.4% and 18.2% of the sample, respectively. Just over 10% (10.6%) of the sample had completed a Technical Certificate (Level I, II, III, or IV), followed by 7.0% of the sample who had completed only Year 10 of school. Those who had completed a Trade Certificate or Nursing Diploma comprised 7.1% of the sample. Finally, participants with a Postgraduate Degree, those with a Graduate Certificate or Graduate Diploma, those who had completed Primary school, and those who identified that they had not had any or much formal schooling represented 5.5%, 3.8%, 2.5% and 2.1% of the sample, respectively.

With respect to employment status, the majority of participants reported that they worked full-time (52.2%), followed by those working part-time (13.0%) and those who were homemakers (8.3%). Participants who were studying full-time or studying and

working represented 8.0% and 4.0% of the sample, respectively (see Table 9). The remaining sample included participants who were not employed but looking for work (3.0%), those who were retired (4.0%), and those who were not employed and not looking for work (3.0%).

Participants were asked to report their religious affiliation. As can be seen in Table 9, 44.1% of the total sample adhered to Islam, followed by Christianity (18.9%) and Buddhism (19.3%). Those who reported having *no* religion constituted 15.3% of the sample. Only 0.2% of the sample reported being Hindu, while 0.1% of the sample reported adhering to Judaism. Finally, 2.1% of the sample affiliated with a religion other than those mentioned above.

Participants reported their marital status; whereby almost half of the sample were married or in a de-facto relationship (46.2%). Those who were single comprised 44.4% of the sample, followed by 7.4% who were divorced or separated, and 2.0% who were widowed. Finally, participants were asked about their household income in 2017. Reported income varied, with the average annual income being $67,500 (for a more detailed breakdown, see Table 9). For a breakdown of how some of these demographic variables vary by the three immigrant groups (Vietnamese, Middle Eastern Muslim, UK/Irish immigrants) see Tables 4-8 in the previous Sample Representativeness section.

Table 9 Summary of Demographic Background Variables for Total Sample (N=903) against 2016 Census data for *all* people living in Sydney

	Total Survey Sample				Sydney Census Data		Absolute Difference
Variable	**Mean**	**Median**	**SD**	**%**	**Median**	**%**	**%**
Age	33.71	30.0	12.9		36		
Gender							
Male				49.6		52.7	-3.1
Female				50.4		47.3	+3.1
Country of Birth							
Australia				49.5		37.4	+12.1
Overseas				50.5		62.6	-12.1
Ancestry							
Vietnamese				43.4		1.9[15]	+41.5
Lebanese				38.4		2.7	+35.7
British (English; Welsh; Scottish)				9.8		28.0	-18.2
Irish				2.1		4.5	-2.4
Egyptian				1.5		0.4	+1.1
Other				4.4		62.5	-58.1
Can Speak English Well							
Yes				91.5		93.1	-1.6
No				8.5		6.9	+1.6
Educational Attainment							
Did not have any or much formal schooling				2.1		1.8[16]	+0.3
Primary school				2.5		5.8	-3.3
Junior secondary/intermediate/form 4/year 10				7.0		4.4	+24.0
Senior secondary/leaving/form 6/year 12				21.4			
Certificate (Level I, II, III, or IV)				10.6		8.9	+8.8
Trade certificate or nursing diploma				7.1			

[15] In the Sydney Census data, the top 5 ancestries were English (25.1%); Chinese (9.6%); Irish (4.5%); Indian (3.6%); and Italian (3.4%)
[16] Listed as *Pre-school* in the Census data

	Total Survey Sample				Sydney Census Data		Absolute Difference
Variable	**Mean**	**Median**	**SD**	**%**	**Median**	**%**	**%**
Diploma or Advanced Diploma				18.2			
Bachelor's Degree				21.8			
Graduate Certificate or Graduate Diploma				3.8		24.1	+1.3
Postgraduate Degree (Masters or PhD)				5.5			
Employment Status							
Working full-time				52.2		61.2	-9.0
Working part-time				13.0		28.2	-15.2
Not employed but looking for work				4.2		6.0	+1.2
Not employed and not looking for work				3.0			
Studying and working				7.4		-	
Studying full-time				8.0		4.5	+15.8
Retired				4.0			
Home duties				8.3			
Religion							
Christianity (e.g., Catholic, Protestant, Anglican, etc.)				18.9		56.5	-37.6
Islam				44.1		5.7	+38.4
Judaism				0.1		0.8	-0.7
Buddhism				19.3		4.2	+15.1
Hinduism				0.2		3.9	-3.7
Other				2.1		1.1	+1.0
No Religion				15.3		27.3[17]	-12.0
Marital Status							
Married (including de- facto relationships)				46.2		28.8	+17.4
Single (never married)				44.4		59.3	-14.9
Widowed				2.0		2.2	-0.2
Divorced or separated				7.4		9.8	-2.4

[17] Listed as *Secular beliefs and other spiritual beliefs and no religious affiliation* in the Sydney Census data.

	Total Survey Sample				Sydney Census Data		Absolute Difference
Variable	Mean	Median	SD	%	Median	%	%
Household Income ('000s)	14.51 ($67,500)		7.8		Median annual: $60,000		
$0				5.9		7.4	-1.5
$5				0.3		3.9	-3.6
$10-$15				4.1		5.7	-1.6
$20				3.2		7.3	-4.1
$25				3.7		7.9	-4.2
$30				3.8		7.4	-3.6
$35-$40				9.0		7.4	+1.6
$45				4.0		8.6	-4.6
$50-$60				18.5		9.7	+8.8
$65-$70				9.7		7.3	+2.4
$75-$85				8.3		6.6	+1.7
$90-$100				8.3		5.0	+3.3
$110-$140				9.5		8.5	+1.0
$150+				9.6		7.3	+2.3

2.2 Section 2: Social Identification

2.2.1 National Identity and Ethnic Group Identity

Section 2 of the *Sydney Immigrant Survey* gauged participants' level of self-identification with various groups in society. People can identify with various groups and may identify with one group more so than another (Huo, 2003). Ascertaining participants' strength of identity with different groups was included to understand the extent to which participants in the sample identify as Australian, and with their ethnic/racial group. Each item has been adapted from the work of Haslam (2004) and Murphy and colleagues (2010).

Three survey items were used to create each of the Australian identity (e.g., *'I identify strongly with being Australian'*) and Ethnic group identity (e.g., *'It is important for me to be seen by others to be a member of my ethnic/racial group'*) scales. Part 3 presents a list of all survey questions used to construct these two identity scales. An examination of the means of each of these two scales (see Figure 1) shows that participants identify more strongly with their superordinate-level Australian identity (Mean = 4.15; SD = 0.71) than

with their Ethnic sub-group identity (Mean = 3.88; SD = 0.91). When exploring strength of identity with Australia and one's ethnic/racial group for each of the three immigrant groups separately, it was found that Muslims identified the most with both their Australian identity (Mean = 4.41; SD = 0.57) and their ethnic identity (Mean = 4.12; SD = 0.92), followed by Vietnamese participants who also identified strongly with an Australian identity (Mean = 4.01; SD = 0.67) and with their ethnic identity (Mean = 3.75; SD = 0.82). When compared to the Middle Eastern Muslim and Vietnamese participants, those from the UK/Ireland identified the least with their Australian identity (Mean = 3.71; SD = 0.94) and their ethnic identity (Mean = 3.45; SD = 0.92). For all three immigrant groups, Australian identity was seen to be more important than ethnic/racial identity. Table 10 presents an analysis of statistical differences between mean scores on these scales for the three immigrant groups.



Figure 1 Mean scores for Australian identity and Ethnic/Racial identity for the total sample and for each of the three immigrant groups

2.2.2 Braithwaite's Theory of Defiance: The Three Selves

One of the main aims of this research project was to understand why some immigrants disengage from police. Valerie Braithwaite's (2009) *Theory of Defiance* was used as the theoretical framework in which to examine immigrants' disengagement from police.

Braithwaite's (2009) theory attempts to understand how and why individuals react the way they do toward authorities, and how they subsequently manage their encounters with authorities. Braithwaite's work is important because it provides a new perspective for understanding why an authority's actions can result in citizen disengagement. It has also been used to explain why procedural justice may not always promote citizens' cooperation with authorities (Murphy, 2017). It can also explain why some individuals and groups might be more receptive to procedural justice than others (see Sargeant, et al., 2014) and Murphy (2017) for evidence that some groups respond to procedural justice policing more positively than others).

Braithwaite (2009, 2013) considered how and why people come to be resistant or disengaged from authorities. She argued that all authorities, regardless of context, pose a threat to people's freedom and status. This is because of the power authorities wield and their ability to curb people's behaviour. Specifically, Braithwaite suggests that when an authority's actions threaten an identity that is important to a person this can result in either resistance or disengagement.

Braithwaite postulates that people can identify themselves according to three selves: with a *moral identity*, a *status seeking identity*, and a *democratic collective identity*. Each of these three self-identities is important to people and each shape how individuals perceive and react to encounters with authority. The moral identity takes pride in being seen as a good, law-abiding citizen. The democratic-collective identity tends to value fair, democratic and respectful treatment of all. The status-seeking identity is concerned with status and achievement. Braithwaite demonstrated that if the moral or democratic identities are threatened by an authority's actions, resistance can be the outcome. If both the status-seeking and democratic identities get threatened simultaneously, disengagement can result.

Measures of Braithwaite's three selves were included in Section 2 of the *Sydney Immigrant Survey*. All survey questions used to create scales for Braithwaite's three selves are presented in Part 3 of this report (e.g., democratic collective identity = *'It is important to me that all people in society be treated with dignity and respect'*; moral identity = *'I identify strongly as a law-abiding person'*; status-seeking identity = *'It is important for me to be seen as a person of value in Australia'*). Higher mean scores on the three self-identity scales demonstrates that participants identified more strongly with their democratic collective identity (Mean = 4.27; SD = 0.65), their moral identity (Mean = 4.22; SD = 0.83)

and their status-seeking identity (Mean = 3.61; SD = 0.75), respectively. As can be seen in Figure 2, the total sample was most likely to self-identify with a democratic collective identity, and least likely with their status-seeking identity.

Figure 2 also demonstrates how each of the three immigrant groups self-identify with these three selves. There are small differences between the three groups. The UK/Irish sample identified more strongly with their moral identity (Mean = 4.41; SD = 0.61) than the Middle Eastern Muslim (Mean = 4.28; SD = 1.00) or Vietnamese (Mean = 4.10; SD = 0.67) participants. Vietnamese participants had the strongest status-seeking identity (Mean = 3.75; SD = 0.67) when compared to the Middle Eastern Muslim (Mean = 3.60; SD = 0.85) and UK/Irish sample (Mean = 3.54; SD = 0.64). Finally, both the UK/Irish (Mean = 4.33; SD = 0.56) and Middle Eastern Muslim (Mean = 4.33; SD = 0.71) participants identified equally as much with their democratic collective identity, followed by Vietnamese participants (Mean = 4.19; SD = 0.59). Table 10 presents statistical differences between the mean scores on these scales for the three immigrant groups.



Figure 2 Mean scores for Braithwaite's three identities for the total sample and for each of the three immigrant groups

2.2.3 Autonomy Identity

An additional identity scale was included in Section 2 of the *Sydney Immigrant Survey* that measured participants' 'autonomy identity'. Developed by Huq, Jackson and Trinkner (2016), autonomy identity refers to the sense of agency that individuals feel they have over their lives. Such autonomy includes the freedom to make decisions, to feel unrestricted, and to avoid situations where other people make decisions on an individual's behalf. The autonomy identity scale was a three-item scale (e.g., *'It is important to me to avoid situations where someone tells me what to do'*). Those who score higher on the autonomy identity scale are more likely to see autonomy as important to their sense of self.

Three items were included in the scale that measured autonomy identity (e.g., '*It is important to me that a person's freedom of choice is not restricted'*). A list of these items is outlined in Section 3 of this report. Results of the mean score for the autonomy identity scale suggest that participants strongly value a sense of autonomy (Mean = 4.18; SD = 0.62); that is, their identity as an autonomous person is very important to their sense of self. Exploring differences between the three immigrant groups, it was found that Middle Eastern Muslims (Mean = 4.23; SD = 0.71) valued autonomy slightly more than the UK immigrants (Mean = 4.15; SD = 0.53) and Vietnamese immigrants (Mean = 4.13; SD = 0.53), although there was more variability in responses for the Middle Eastern Muslim group as indicated by the higher standard deviation score for this group (see Figure 3). A follow-up t-test revealed no significant difference in level of autonomy identity between the male and female Muslim respondents; both male and female Muslims valued this identity equally ($t(396)=-.47$, $p>0.05$).



Figure 3 Mean scores for autonomy identity for the total sample and for each of the three immigrant groups

2.2.4 Propensity to Trust Others

An individual's propensity to trust others refers to their predisposition to trust most people (Ham, Trinkner & Carr, 2017). An immigrants' propensity to trust most people might have an influence on their propensity to also trust police. Hence, two items were included in Section 2 of the survey to measure participants' agreement with the notion that '*Most people can be trusted'* and '*Most people try to be fair'*. A higher score on the two-item scale suggests participants have a higher propensity for generalised trust. The mean score for the total immigrant sample was close to the midpoint of the scale, suggesting only a mild propensity to trust most other people (Mean = 3.36; SD = 0.95). Specifically, when examining the frequency distribution of this scale, the majority of the sample (41.9%) agreed that they have a propensity to trust, followed by almost 20% (19.6%) who neither agreed nor disagreed. Comparing the three immigrant groups, it was found that the UK/Irish participants had a higher tendency to trust others in general (Mean = 3.86; SD = 0.72) followed by Vietnamese participants (Mean = 3.49; SD = 0.81). Middle Eastern Muslim participants had the lowest propensity to trust when compared to the other immigrant groups (Mean = 3.10; SD = 1.04), but they also had the most variability in trust

responses as indicated by the high standard deviation score. Figure 4 presents these findings graphically (see Table 10 for tests for statistical differences between the three immigrant groups).



Figure 4 Mean scores for participants' propensity to trust others for the total sample and for each of the three immigrant groups

2.3 Section 3: Social Inclusion and Identity Threat

Section 3 of the survey asked participants a range of questions pertaining to their feelings of social inclusion in Australia and their feelings of acceptance by others within Australia. These concepts were measured by asking people about the opportunities they felt were available to them in Australia, and feelings of alienation in Australia.

2.3.1 Opportunities for Future

A series of questions were included to measure participants' perceptions of their own opportunities within Australia. Based on a measure developed by Murphy, Madon, Mutongwizo and Williamson (2017), three items were included to gauge whether participants agreed or disagreed with statements that asked whether they felt they had opportunities in Australia or if they felt at a disadvantage because of their race/ethnicity

(e.g., *'You have the same chance of achieving success as anyone else in Australia'*). A higher score on the three-item 'opportunities for future' scale suggests participants perceive they do have opportunities in Australia. Results show that the majority of participants neither agreed nor disagreed with the statements (Mean = 3.57; SD = 0.80). As can be seen in Table 10, Middle Eastern Muslim and Vietnamese participants believed they had *fewer* opportunities in Australia (Mean = 3.43; SD = 0.79 and Mean = 3.51; SD = 0.75, respectively), when compared to the UK/Irish participants (Mean = 4.28; SD = 0.66). Hence, ethnic/racial minority status does seem to have an effect on how people perceive their opportunities in Australia.

2.3.2 Feelings of Social Inclusion

Feeling socially included is fundamental to an individual's sense of self and well-being (Tajfel, 1982). Feeling socially excluded can lead to alienation and feelings of identity threat (Murphy & Cherney, 2018). Four questions were developed by the Research Team and were included in the survey to examine how the three immigrant groups felt others in society viewed them (e.g., *'Australians respect what people like you contribute to Australia'*). It was elicited to gauge whether the Vietnamese and Middle Eastern Muslim participants felt their groups were less socially included in Australia. A higher score on this scale is associated with greater feelings of social inclusion and acceptance. The survey findings showed that for the total sample, social inclusion fell close to the midpoint of the scale; in other words, participants neither agreed nor disagreed that they felt socially included in Australia (Mean = 3.32; SD = 0.75). However, as can be seen in both Figure 5 and Table 10, UK/Irish participants felt the most socially included of the three immigrant groups (Mean = 4.06; SD = 0.72), followed by Vietnamese participants (Mean = 3.47; SD = 0.60). Middle Eastern Muslim participants reported feeling the least socially included of the three groups in Australia (Mean = 2.97; SD = 0.70).



Figure 5 Mean scores for participants' feelings of social inclusion for the total sample and for each of the three immigrant groups

2.3.3 Identity Threat from Police

In addition to measuring participants' feelings of opportunity and social inclusion in Australia, a series of questions were also included to gauge whether participants felt that police officers pose a threat to their valued identities. As noted earlier, Section 2 of the survey measured participants' strength of identity with Braithwaite's three selves (moral identity; democratic collective identity; status seeking identity), as well as with an autonomy identity. In Section 3 of the survey, participants were asked how much police threatened these four different identities. Identity threat from police is measured through four distinct multi-item scales: moral identity threat; status identity threat; democratic collective identity threat; and autonomy threat. As is demonstrated below, it was found overall that Muslim immigrants were more likely to perceive police as threatening to their identity.

2.3.3.1 Threat to Moral Identity

Threat to one's moral identity examines the extent to which individuals perceive police to be a threat to their law-abiding identity. For example, a person may feel their moral self is under threat by police if they believe police view them suspiciously or as a threat to community safety. In other words, this can challenge one's sense that they are viewed as a law-abiding citizen. Six survey items were developed by the Research Team and included in the survey to gauge the extent of police threat against the moral identity (e.g., *'Police are suspicious of people like you'*). A higher score on the scale denotes a stronger sense of threat to the moral identity. The mean score for the total sample suggests, on average, participants do not view police as threatening to their moral identity (Mean = 2.67; SD = 0.82). However, as can be seen in Figure 6 and Table 10, Middle Eastern Muslims perceived police to be a greater threat to their moral identity (Mean = 3.01; SD = 0.80) when compared to the Vietnamese participants (Mean = 2.52; SD = 0.70) or the UK/Irish participants (Mean = 1.97; SD = 0.63). UK/Irish immigrants were the least likely to view police as threatening to their moral identity.

2.3.3.2 Threat to Status Seeking Identity

Threat to one's status seeking identity refers to an individual's perception that their perceived status within society is under threat by authorities. For example, a person may experience an elevated sense of status identity threat if they believe police do not view them as having much status in the community. Five items were developed by the Research Team to create the status identity threat scale (e.g., *'Police view people like you as having high status in society'*). A higher score suggests a greater sense of perceived threat to the status identity. Like for moral identity threat, the total sample as a whole neither agreed nor disagreed that their status seeking self was under threat by police (Mean = 2.80; SD = 0.71). As can be seen in Figure 6 and Table 10, however, the Middle Eastern Muslim sample reported a much higher perceived threat to their societal status from police (Mean = 3.05; SD = 0.71) when compared to Vietnamese (Mean = 2.76; SD = 0.59) and UK/Irish participants (Mean = 2.31; SD = 0.68). Relative to the UK/Irish participants the Vietnamese participants were also more likely to perceive police as a threat to their status seeking identity.

2.3.3.3 Threat to Democratic Collective Identity

The democratic collective identity threat scale assesses the extent to which an individual perceives they are not being treated in a democratic or fair way by authorities. For example, if people feel that police do not listen to them or that police treat their group disrespectfully, they may feel a heightened sense of threat to this identity, particularly if the democratic collective identity is important to how they see themselves as individuals. Three items were developed by the Research Team and included in the survey (e.g., *'Police are disinterested in what people like you have to say about local issues'*). A higher score on the scale suggests participants had a stronger sense of democratic collective identity threat. Findings showed that participants in the total sample neither agreed nor disagreed with the notion that their democratic collective identity was under threat (Mean = 2.75; SD = 0.77), with the average score falling slightly below the midpoint of the scale. As can be seen in Figure 6 and Table 10, however, the Middle Eastern Muslim sample once again felt more threatened by police. They reported a slightly stronger perception that they were being treated in a non-democratic way by police, but this feeling was right on the midpoint of the scale suggesting some Muslims felt threatened while others did not (Mean = 3.01; SD = 0.76). Relative to the Muslim group, Vietnamese participants (Mean = 2.66; SD = 0.68) and the UK/Irish sample (Mean = 2.11; SD = 0.67) were less likely to perceive police as threatening to their democratic collective identity.

2.3.3.4 Autonomy Threat

A three-item autonomy threat scale was included in the survey to measure the degree to which immigrants experience a threat to their autonomy from police. Developed by Trinkner and colleagues (2018), the concept of autonomy threat relates to a sense of threat individuals feel when their agency to make autonomous decisions is being invaded or violated by authorities. For example, police powers to detain individuals, to move them on from public space, and their directives may pose a threat to people's sense of autonomy, which can impact how such individuals perceive the role and function of police.

Three items were included to measure autonomy threat (e.g., *'Police often restrict the freedom of people like you'*). A higher score on the scale suggests participants feel a heightened sense of autonomy threat from police. The mean score for the full sample

suggests that participants disagreed slightly with the notion that they felt their autonomy was under threat by police directives or decisions (Mean = 2.66; SD = 1.05). However, it can be seen that the standard deviation score for this scale was quite high, suggesting there was substantial variability in how this set of questions was answered by participants. As can be seen in Figure 6 and Table 10, Middle Eastern Muslim participants reported that they felt their autonomy was under greater threat by authorities (Mean = 3.11; SD = 1.10) than the other two immigrant groups. The UK/Irish sample (Mean = 2.01; SD = 0.72) and the Vietnamese sample (Mean = 2.38; SD = 0.87) were much less likely to hold this view.



Figure 6 Mean scores for feelings of identity threat from police for the total sample and for each of the three immigrant groups

2.3.4 Feeling Stigmatised

The notion of feeling stigmatised by authorities has become a common reported feeling among minority groups. For example, recent research has highlighted the propensity for Muslims to feel highly scrutinised by authorities, the media and the public (Breen Smyth, 2014; Cherney & Murphy, Madon, Mutongwizo & Williamson, 2017; Murphy, Madon & Cherney, 2018). Such scrutiny, particularly if the target group feels they are

viewed as a threat to community safety can result in feelings of stigmatisation. Four questions were included in the survey that examined participants' self-reported feelings of stigmatisation from authorities, the media, and the public (e.g., *'I sometimes feel under scrutiny by police and authorities because of my ethnicity, race or religion'*). Items were adapted from the work of Murphy, Cherney and Barkworth (2015) and Murphy et al. (2018). A higher score on the scale represents a higher sense of feeling stigmatised from authorities, the media, and the wider public. Overall, it was found that the total sample did not feel stigmatised (Mean = 2.74; SD = 1.10). Once again, however, the standard deviation for this scale was very high, suggesting a great deal of variability between survey respondents. When analyzing how immigrants from the three different groups responded to these questions it can be seen from Figure 7 and Table 10 that Muslims felt the most stigmatised of the three immigrant groups (Mean = 3.30; SD = 1.07), while the Vietnamese sample (Mean = 2.45; SD = 0.90) and the UK/Irish (Mean = 1.72; SD = 0.69) sample did not report feeling stigmatised at all.



Figure 7 Mean scores for feelings of stigmatisation for the total sample and for each of the three immigrant groups

Table 10 presents the mean scores for all measures discussed in this section for the total sample and for each of the three immigrant groups separately. Table 10 also

indicates where a statistically significant difference between groups was obtained through independent samples t-tests.

Table 10 Mean scores and t-test results comparing the three immigrant groups for all identity, social inclusion, and identity threat scales

Variable	Total Sample		UK/Irish		Middle Eastern Muslim		Vietnamese	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Australian identity	4.15	0.71	3.71[b,c]	0.94	4.41[a,c]	0.57	4.01[a,b]	0.67
Ethnic identity	3.88	0.91	3.45[b,c]	0.92	4.12[a,c]	0.92	3.75[a,b]	0.82
Moral identity	4.22	0.83	4.41[c]	0.60	4.28[c]	1.00	4.10[a,b]	0.67
Status seeking identity	3.61	0.75	3.54	0.64	3.60	0.85	3.64	0.67
Democratic collective identity	4.27	0.65	4.33[c]	0.56	4.33[c]	0.71	4.19[a,b]	0.59
Autonomy identity	4.18	0.62	4.15	0.53	4.23[c]	0.71	4.13[b]	0.53
Propensity to trust others	3.36	0.95	3.86[b,c]	0.72	3.10[a,c]	1.04	3.49[a,b]	0.81
Opportunities for Future	3.57	0.80	4.28[b,c]	0.66	3.43[a]	0.79	3.51[a]	0.75
Social Inclusion	3.32	0.75	4.06[b,c]	0.72	2.97[a,c]	0.70	3.47[a,b]	0.60
Identity Threat from Police								
Moral identity threat	2.67	0.82	1.97[b,c]	0.63	3.01[a,c]	0.80	2.52[a,b]	0.70
Status Seeking identity threat	2.80	0.71	2.31[b,c]	0.68	3.05[a,c]	0.71	2.76[a,b]	0.59
Democratic collective identity threat	2.75	0.77	2.11[b,c]	0.67	3.01[a,c]	0.76	2.66[a,b]	0.68
Autonomy identity threat	2.66	1.05	2.01[b,c]	0.72	3.11[a,c]	1.10	2.38[a,b]	0.87
Stigmatisation	2.74	1.10	1.72[b,c]	0.69	3.30[a,c]	1.07	2.45[a,b]	0.90

t-test results: [a]=significantly different from UK immigrants at $p<0.05$; [b]=significantly different from Middle Eastern Muslim immigrants at $p<0.05$; [c]=significantly different from Vietnamese immigrants at $p<0.05$.

2.4 Section 4: Crime, Violence & Victimisation Experience

2.4.1 Crime Victimisation

Section 4 of the *Sydney Immigrant Survey* asked a range of questions relating to survey participants' perceptions of crime rates in their neighbourhood, as well as experiences of personal crime victimisation (see Table 11). Crime tends to be concentrated in particular areas of a city and can sometimes affect some groups more than others – known as crime

hotspots. As Eck (2005, p1) notes, crime "clumps in some areas and is absent in others". The survey attempted to measure respondents' perceptions of crime in their own neighbourhoods with one question (*'Overall, would you say that crime in your suburb is…. Very low, somewhat low, about average, somewhat high, or very high'*). As can be seen in Table 11, participants overall tended to perceive crime in their neighbourhood to be quite low. However, just over 20% of the respondents indicated that crime in their neighbourhood was either somewhat high or very high (21.6%). However, when examining differences between the three immigrant groups, there were some significant differences in crime perception. The Middle Eastern Muslim community was the most likely group to perceive a crime problem in their suburb (Mean = 2.78; SD = 1.18), followed by the Vietnamese community (Mean = 2.60; SD = 1.06) and UK/Immigrant group (Mean = 1.79; SD = 0.93). The Muslims' mean score on the crime perception item was statistically different from both the Vietnamese and UK/Irish immigrant groups ($t(791)=2.59$, $p<.05$ and $t(506) = 8.13$, $p<0.001$, respectively). There was no statistical difference between the mean scores for the Vietnamese or UK/Irish participants. Approximately twenty-eight per cent (27.4%) of the Muslims believed crime was somewhat high or very high in their suburb, compared to 20% for the Vietnamese immigrants and 6.4% for the UK/Irish immigrants.

It can also be seen from Table 11 that the majority of participants had not experienced various forms of crime victimisation. Eight different types of crime were presented to immigrants in the survey and respondents were to indicate whether they had ever experienced that form of victimisation in Australia (e.g., home burglary; Yes/No). An overall crime victimisation index was created by summing the number of 'Yes' responses that participants reported. A score of 0 indicates none of the victimisation categories listed had been experienced, while a score of 8 indicates that the respondent had personally experienced all eight types of crime. The average number of victimisations experienced was low overall for the total sample (Mean = 0.99, SD = 1.53). Home burglary was the most common form of victimisation experienced, with 24.5% of the sample having experienced this form of victimisation. Interestingly, in a follow-up question approximately 22% of participants indicated there was an occasion where they had experienced victimisation but did *not* report it to police (21.2%).

Table 11 Perceptions of Crime and Previous Victimisation for the total sample

Variable	Mean	Median	Standard Deviation	%
Overall, would you say that crime in your suburb is…?	2.58		1.14	
Very low				21.4
Somewhat low				25.7
About average				31.3
Somewhat high				16.7
Very high				4.9
Victimisation	0.99		1.53	
Have you ever been a victim of…?				
Burglary/House break-in?				
Yes				24.5
No				75.5
Theft of a motor vehicle?				
Yes				13.7
No				86.3
Other property theft?				
Yes				20.6
No				79.4
Damage, vandalism or graffiti to your property or car?[2]				
Yes				16.1
No				83.9
Physical assault?[2]				
Yes				9.0
No				91.0
Sexual assault?				
Yes				3.4
No				96.6
Violence at home by someone you know?				
Yes				4.2
No				95.8
Other crime?				
Yes				7.2
No				92.8

2.4.2 Support for Violence

Muslim communities in the West have come under increased scrutiny as a result of Islamic-inspired terrorism. Politicians and media reports claim that the Islamic religion is more likely to support and condone violence. To test this claim, Section 4 of the survey included a series of questions that gauged whether participants agreed or disagreed with three statements related to support for violence (e.g., *'It is sometimes appropriate for people to use violence to support a political, ideological, or religious cause'*). Overall, the mean score for the 3-item Support for Violence scale shows that the full sample of respondents did not agree with the three statements (Mean = 1.61; SD = 0.84) as the mean score was well below the midpoint of the 5-point scale. Comparing the three immigrant groups with a series of independent t-tests, however, it was found that the Middle Eastern Muslim sample was slightly more likely to support violence (Mean = 1.71; SD = 0.92) than either the UK/Irish sample (Mean = 1.49; SD = 0.77) or the Vietnamese sample (Mean = 1.55; SD = 0.80) respectively ($t(506) = 2.26$, $p<0.05$; and $t(791) = 2.59$, $p<0.05$). There was no significant difference in views supporting violence between the UK/Irish and Vietnamese samples. These findings should be taken with caution; Muslims as a group were still unlikely to support violence in our sample.

Figure 8 illustrates the mean scores for the three individual violence measures included in the overall scale. These scores demonstrate that on average, participants were not supportive of the use of violence to achieve goals. When examining perceptions towards violence between the three immigrant groups, there were few differences in views between the UK/Irish sample, the Middle Eastern Muslim sample, and the Vietnamese sample. All immigrant groups disagreed with each of the statements related to support for violence.



Figure 8 Mean scores for support for violence for the total sample and for each of the three immigrant groups

2.5 Section 5: Perceptions of Government and Police

Section 5 of the Survey was the largest section. It contained a large number of questions assessing participants' perceptions of government and the police in Australia. One of the major aims of the research project was to explore immigrants' perceptions of police in Australia, and how various attitudes and values were related to these perceptions. Concepts such as trust in police, the perceived legitimacy of police, and assessments of the effectiveness of police were measured. Also, of interest was how immigrants evaluated police in terms of their use of procedural justice when interacting with citizens. Finally, two items measured participants' attitudes towards the government. Each concept and the findings are discussed in the sections below.

2.5.1 Trust in Government

One focus of this project was to examine immigrant attitudes in a politicised environment (e.g., with enduring social and national security threats). As such, two items were included

to measure participants' trust in the Australian government (e.g., *'How much do you agree or disagree that you have trust and confidence in the Australian government?'*). A higher mean score on this two-item scale suggests participants are more trusting of the government. Results demonstrate that on average, participants were only slightly trusting of the Australian government (Mean = 3.31; SD = 1.01). Table 12 presents the mean scores for this trust in government scale across the three immigrant groups. Vietnamese participants were most trusting of the Australian government (Mean = 3.52; SD = 0.86), when compared to those from the UK/Irish (Mean = 3.42; SD = 0.85) or the Middle Eastern Muslim cohort (Mean = 3.07; SD = 1.13). T-tests revealed (see Table 12) that trust in government for the UK/Irish and Vietnamese groups were significantly higher than for the Middle Eastern Muslim group ($t(506)=3.02$, $p<0.05$ and $t(791)=6.31$, $p<0.001$); there was no significant difference in mean trust scores between the Vietnamese and UK/Irish groups.

2.5.2 Cultural Norms Regarding Police

Given the focus on different immigrant groups in this research project it was important to establish whether different immigrant groups believed there were any cultural norms around their own groups' views of police. These norms may influence how individual immigrants perceive police. Hence, four survey items were included in Section 5 of the survey that measured perceptions of how members of their own ancestral group viewed police (e.g., *'How many people in Australia with your ancestry do you think have trust and confidence in the Australian police'*). These questions represent cultural norms towards police. A higher mean score suggests participants felt more people in their ancestral group perceived police positively. Results demonstrate that on average, participants felt others in their ancestral group had somewhat positive attitudes towards police (Mean = 3.44; SD = 0.63), but it should be noted that the mean score was relatively close to the midpoint of the scale. As can be seen in Table 12, participants from the UK/Ireland believed members of their cultural group perceived police more positively (Mean = 3.85; SD = 0.54) when compared to Vietnamese (Mean = 3.54; SD = 0.59) and Middle Eastern Muslim participants (Mean = 3.24; SD = 0.61). The Middle Eastern Muslim group were the least likely to think their cultural group trusted police. Table 14 presents the outcomes of several t-tests which show which mean scores differ significantly from each other; in summary, all groups differed significantly from each other.

2.5.3 Solidarity with Police

The solidarity with police scale measures the extent to which people identify positively with police and see them to be people like them. Five items were included in the survey and were based on the work of Prati et al. (2009) and Radburn et al. (2018). Participants were asked their feelings towards police (e.g., *'To what extent do you perceive police officers to be like you'* and *'I feel a sense of solidarity with police'*). A higher mean score on the five-item scale suggests participants feel more solidarity with police and see police to be like them. Upon examining the mean score for the scale, it was found that solidarity with police was more negative than positive (Mean = 2.87; SD = 0.70). When examining how each of the three immigrant groups responded to this scale, it can be seen from Table 12 that the UK/Irish participants felt the greatest solidarity with police (Mean = 3.04; SD = 0.60), followed by Middle Eastern Muslim participants (Mean = 2.93; SD = 0.65) and then Vietnamese participants (Mean = 2.75; SD = 0.75). T-tests revealed that the Middle Eastern Muslim and UK/Irish groups did not differ significantly from each other, while the Vietnamese participants differed from both the UK/Irish and Middle Eastern Muslim groups (see Table 12).

2.5.4 Police Legitimacy

Legitimacy is the belief that an authority has the right to govern; it promotes people's willingness to obey authorities and act in their best interests. Legitimacy is important for an authority to have because they rely on members of the public to follow their rules and decisions. Without legitimacy, an authority lacks to credibility to be obeyed. Three factors have commonly been identified as important when measuring the perceived legitimacy of police. They are: 1) moral alignment; 2) trust and confidence in police; and 3) obligation to obey police. Each of these three subcomponents of legitimacy were measured in Section 5 of the survey.

2.5.4.1 Police Legitimacy: Moral Alignment

Research finds that the more morally aligned the police are with the community, the more legitimate they are perceived to be by the public (Hough et al, 2017). To be morally aligned with the public means that the authority shares the same sense of right and wrong as the public, and also shares the same values as the public they serve. If moral alignment is low,

then authorities will struggle to win the support of the public. Hence, moral alignment is an important aspect to gauging the perceived legitimacy of police. Three items were adapted from Hough and colleagues (2017) to measure moral alignment in the current survey (e.g., *'The police share the same values as people like me'*). A higher score on the scale suggests participants were more likely to agree police share similar values with their own immigrant community. Results show that police were perceived as somewhat morally aligned with the immigrants' community (Mean = 3.60; SD = 0.72). Comparing across immigrant groups, the UK/Irish sample (Mean = 3.79; 0.71) perceived that police shared more similar values with their community than the Vietnamese (Mean = 3.68; SD = 0.62) or the Middle Eastern Muslim participants (Mean = 3.46; SD = 0.78). Table 12 shows which of the three immigrant groups differ significantly from each other on this measure of legitimacy.

2.5.4.2 Police Legitimacy: Trust and Confidence in Police

Public trust and confidence in police is crucial to ensuring people perceive police as legitimate (Jackson & Bradford, 2010). A police agency that is not trusted by the public will struggle to gain the willing cooperation of members of the public (Murphy, Mazerolle & Bennet, 2014). Five survey items were included to measure participants' overall trust and confidence in police (e.g., *'I have trust and confidence in the police'*). These items assessed overall trust and confidence in police, support for police, and respect for police. A higher score on the trust and confidence scale is associated with stronger trust and confidence in police. Overall, participants were generally more trusting of the police than not (Mean = 3.62; SD = 0.67). Table 12 shows that when disaggregated by immigrant group, Middle Eastern Muslim participants had the *least* trust and confidence in police (Mean = 3.51; SD = 0.65), followed by the Vietnamese sample (Mean = 3.62; SD = 0.67) and then the UK/Irish sample (Mean = 4.06; SD = 0.57). In other words, the UK/Irish group was the most trusting of police. Table 12 shows which of the three immigrant groups differ significantly from each other on this measure of legitimacy.

2.5.4.3 Police Legitimacy: Moral Obligation to Obey Police

Feeling a moral obligation to obey police is another indicator of the legitimacy of police; it suggests that police are entitled to be obeyed. A police force that lacks legitimacy struggles to gain the willing obedience of the community (Hough, et al., 2017). Feeling morally obligated to obey police means that obedience is not borne from fear of punishment for non-compliance, but rather the belief that one 'should' obey authorities because it is the

right thing to do. Four items were included in the survey that measure participants' moral obligation to obey police (e.g., *'I feel a moral obligation to obey police'*). A higher score on the scale suggests participants had a stronger moral obligation to obey. Findings show that participants generally feel an obligation to obey police (Mean = 3.90; SD = 0.63). Table 12 shows that the Middle Eastern Muslim sample (Mean = 3.99; SD = 0.69) felt slightly more obligated to obey police than the UK/Irish sample (Mean = 3.86; SD = 0.51) and the Vietnamese sample (Mean = 3.82; SD = 0.59). Table 12 shows which of the three immigrant groups differ significantly from each other on this measure of legitimacy.

2.5.5 Coerced Obligation to Obey/Dull Compulsion to Obey

As noted above, a moral obligation to obey police suggests that people will comply with police because they believe it is the right thing to do; here compliance is voluntarily given from a sense of obligation. Compliance, however, can also be elicited from fear or coercion. In the Sydney Immigrant Survey, we were interested in measuring feelings of both willing obligation to obey police and feelings of coerced obligation. From his research in Africa, Tankebe (2009) put forward the idea that people living in corrupt societies where police brutality is common will comply with police not due to a belief the police are legitimate or due to a willing obligation to follow the directives of police, but rather due to a fear they will be tortured for not doing so. Tankebe called this type of behaviour a 'dull compulsion to obey'. Such coerced compliance refers to behaviour elicited from feeling a sense of powerlessness (Tankebe, 2009). For example, an individual may obey the police, not because they believe it is right to do so, but because they have resigned themselves to the fact they must comply to avoid a negative consequence (Akinlabi & Murphy, 2018). As mentioned above, prior research suggests that people from certain countries obey authorities out of fear because of the history of police oppression in those countries (Akinlabi & Murphy, 2018). Our study was interested in whether immigrants from Middle Eastern countries and Vietnam may experience heightened feelings of dull compulsion to obey police relative to immigrants from the UK/Ireland. For immigrants to Australia it might be the case that views and experiences of police in their country of origin might influence how immigrants view police in Australia. Hence, three items were included in the survey to measure feelings of dull compulsion among the three immigrant groups (e.g.,

'I only obey the police because I am afraid of them'). A higher score on the scale represents a stronger sense of coerced obligation to obey police.

For the total sample, results showed that participants generally felt little sense of dull compulsion toward obeying police in Australia (Mean = 2.85; SD = 0.91). When comparing responses by the three immigrant groups, findings showed that Vietnamese participants (Mean = 2.95; SD = 0.92) felt higher levels of dull compulsion to obey police. This was followed by Middle Eastern Muslims (Mean = 2.85; SD = 0.92) and then the UK/Irish sample (Mean = 2.48; SD = 0.75; see Table 12 for statistical differences between the three immigrant groups).

2.5.6 Procedural Justice

The major focus of this project is to better understand the importance of procedural justice policing to immigrant communities. A large body of research shows that police use of procedural justice is crucial for *promoting* the perceived legitimacy of police (e.g. Tyler, 1990; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Hinds & Murphy, 2007; Murphy, Hinds & Fleming, 2008). Procedural justice denotes the fairness of the procedures used by authorities and the treatment an individual experiences during a formal interaction with an authority (e.g., police). Procedural justice can be measured by asking participants about actual experiences with police, or via their general perceptions of how they think police treat individuals in the community. Procedural justice is typically measured via four key concepts: opportunity for voice; neutrality; fairness; and respect (Mazerolle et al, 2014). The fairness and respect afforded to an individual during an interaction, the unbiased treatment from an officer, combined with the fairness of a decision that affords the individual an opportunity to voice their perspective are consistently identified as key to an individual's assessment of the procedural justness of an encounter (Tyler & DeGoey, 1996; Tyler & Lind, 1992). The presence of each of these four elements of procedural justice contributes to prolonged public commitment to valuing an authority and complying and cooperating voluntarily with their rules and decisions.

The four elements of procedural justice are represented by ten measures in the *Sydney Immigrant Survey* (e.g., *'Police treat people with dignity and respect'*; see Part 3 of this report for a full list of items). A higher score on the overall procedural justice scale indicates that survey participants view police as more procedurally just. The mean score on this scale for the total sample demonstrates that, on average, participants perceived Australian police

to be somewhat more procedurally just than unjust, but the mean score fell close to the midpoint of the 5-point scale (Mean = 3.36; SD = 0.67). When examining how each of the three immigrant groups perceived police, it can be seen from Table 12 that there was little difference in how procedurally just each immigrant group perceived police to be. Both the UK/Irish sample (Mean = 3.47; SD = 0.61) and the Vietnamese sample (Mean = 3.43; SD = 0.66) viewed police similarly as somewhat procedurally just, while the Middle Eastern Muslim sample perceived police to be slightly less procedurally just (Mean =3.26; SD = 0.69). Table 12 indicates where the differences between the three groups reach statistical significance.

2.5.7 Distributive Justice

Distributive justice is another important factor for promoting police legitimacy. It refers to the fairness and equitability of an authority's distribution of services to different segments of the community (Hinds & Murphy, 2007). If people perceive that police are providing an equivalent service to all groups in the community, they will be perceived as more distributively just. Four items were included in the survey to measure distributive justice (e.g., *'Police in Australia treat everyone in the community equally, regardless of their race, ethnicity or religion'*). A higher mean score on the distributive justice scale demonstrates that participants believe the police act in a more distributively just manner. On average, participants' beliefs regarding the distributive justness of police were neutral (Mean = 3.02; SD = 0.77). On examination of Table 12, it can be seen that the Middle Eastern Muslim sample (Mean = 2.78; SD = 0.78) perceived police as the least distributively just. This was followed by the Vietnamese sample (Mean = 3.18; SD = 0.74) and UK/Irish sample (Mean = 3.32; SD = 0.63). Table 12 shows where the differences between groups are statistically different.

2.5.8 Bounded Authority

The concept of 'bounded authority' was also measured in Section 5 of the survey. Bounded authority refers to the extent that police officers respect and adhere to the limits of their authoritative powers. Developed by Huq, Jackson and Trinkner (2016), this 4-item scale measures the perceived frequency by which police officers are perceived to misuse their powers, and whether they are seen to follow appropriate processes and conduct their duties professionally (e.g. *'Please indicate how often you think the police overstep the boundaries of their authority'*). A higher mean score on the scale represents a greater perception that

police abuse their powers; that is, they breach the bounds of their authority. Relatively few participants reported that police in Australia acted outside of their professional boundaries. On the whole, police in Australia were viewed to be professional, working within the bounds of their authority (Mean = 2.68; SD = 0.90). When broken down by the three immigrant groups, findings showed that Middle Eastern Muslim participants (Mean = 2.86; SD = 0.99) were more likely than Vietnamese immigrants (Mean = 2.54; SD = 0.84) or UK/Irish immigrants (Mean = 2.50; SD = 0.57) to believe police overstep the bounds of their authority (see Table 12 for where the differences between means are statistically significant).

2.5.9 Police Effectiveness

The public often evaluate the police in terms of how effective they are in preventing and solving crime in the community (Hinds & Murphy, 2007). Like for procedural justice and distributive justice, police effectiveness is also important when it comes to evaluating the legitimacy of police (Hinds & Murphy, 2007). A police force that is ineffective in controlling or solving crime will lose their legitimacy in the eyes of the public. The police effectiveness scale used in the *Sydney Immigrant Survey* was comprised of eight questions. The questions gauged how participants felt police were able to prevent and respond to crime and promote community safety and order (e.g., *'How good are police doing at… 'Dealing with problems that concern you'; 'Catching Criminals'*). Adapted from the work of Murphy and colleagues (2010) and Sunshine and Tyler (2003), a higher score on the police effectiveness scale demonstrates that participants felt police do their job more effectively. On average, survey participants perceived police to be effective and doing a good job overall (Mean = 3.60; SD = 0.81). When disaggregating responses by the three immigrant groups, findings showed that the UK/Irish participants perceived police as more effective (Mean = 3.93; SD = 0.65) than the Vietnamese (Mean = 3.58; SD = 0.72) and Middle Eastern Muslim participants (Mean = 3.52; SD = 0.91; see Table 12 for t-tests showing where these differences were statistically different).

2.5.10 Perceived Power Distance between Public and Police

The previous sections assessed how immigrants perceive police regarding how they treat citizens and how effective they are. The survey also asked a number of questions regarding general views about the concept of authority, and willingness to submit to those in authority. One such concept measured was 'power distance'. Power distance describes "the

extent to which inequality among persons in different positions of formal power is viewed as a natural (and even desirable) aspect of the social order" (Brockner, et al., 2001, p. 302). Originally developed by Hofstede (1984) the concept of power distance measures the extent to which the powerful members of organisations or a system accept and expect that power is distributed unequally. It suggests that a society's level of inequality is endorsed by followers as much as by leaders. Research consistently reveals that people from different cultures and countries hold different beliefs about the power distance expected between themselves and those in power (see Hofstede, 1984).

Relatedly, 'power distance norms' relate to what people believe *should* be the differential in power between individuals and authorities. According to Brockner et al. (2001), people who originate from high power distance cultures (e.g., Vietnam; China; Saudi Arabia; etc.) are typically more inclined to accept and legitimise power and decision-making differentials between individuals and authorities; in these cultures, authorities are granted absolute power to make decisions in the interests of the community. Low power distance cultures (e.g., Australia; United Kingdom; United States of America; Canada; etc.), in contrast, facilitate more equitable decision-making powers among individuals and agencies. In this sense, individuals in low power distance countries believe they should have an active role in decision-making processes (Brockner, et al., 2001). Democratic countries such as Australia, the UK, the US, etc. tend to be classified as low power distance countries.

Two questions in the survey first asked participants about the perceived power distance they believe existed between people like themselves and police agencies. Specifically, one item asked how much power participants perceive police to have over them *('How much power do you think police have over people like you?'*; measured on a 'very little' to 'a great deal' scale); with a higher score indicating that police are seen to have a great deal of power over people like them. The second item asked participants how much influence they thought people like them have over police (*'How much influence do you think people like you have over the police?'*; measured on a 'very little' to 'a great deal' scale); a higher score indicates that they believe people like them have a great deal of influence over police. Mean scores on these two questions suggest that participants perceived police to have much power over people like them (Mean = 3.69; SD = 0.87), but

participants felt their own immigrant group had little direct influence over the police (Mean = 2.58; SD = 1.10).

Surprisingly, Table 12 shows that the UK/Irish immigrants (Mean = 3.90; SD = 0.86) thought police had more power over people like them than either the Middle Eastern Muslim participants (Mean = 3.76; SD = 0.89) or Vietnamese participants (Mean = 3.55; SD = 0.83). With respect to the influence question, Vietnamese participants felt people like them had the most influence over police (Mean = 2.71; SD = 0.97). This was followed by the Middle Eastern Muslim participants (Mean = 2.56; SD = 1.22) and the UK/Irish immigrants (Mean = 2.19; SD = 0.93). Table 12 presents the outcome of t-tests which show where these differences between immigrant groups are statistically significant.

2.5.11 Power Distance Norms

Two items were included in the survey to measure immigrants' power distance norms; these items asked participants about the power differential that they believed *should* exist between citizens and police agencies. Specifically, participants were asked how much power police *should* have over them (*'How much power do you think police SHOULD have over people like you?'*), and vice versa how much influence participants felt they *should* have over police (*'How much influence do you think people like you SHOULD have over the police?'*). Based on the literature above, one would expect immigrants from a low power distance country (relative to high power distance country) to think police should have less power over people and that citizens should have more influence over police. Both questions used a 5-point Likert scale to measure responses (1=a lot less; 2=less than now; 3=the same as now; 4=a bit more than now; 5=a lot more than now). A higher mean score on both items suggests participants felt police or participants should have more power than they currently do. The mean scores on each question suggest that on average, participants feel police should have less power over citizens than they currently do (Mean = 2.83; SD = 0.80) and that members of the public should have more influence over police than they currently do (Mean = 3.32; SD = 0.74).

When examining differences in mean scores on these items between the three immigrant groups, it can be seen that the Vietnamese sample (Mean = 2.97; SD = 0.71) felt slightly more strongly that police should have more power than they currently do when compared to the UK/Irish sample (Mean = 2.90; SD = 0.41), although the difference between the two means was not statistically significant. The Middle Eastern Muslim

participants (Mean = 2.67; SD = 0.93) were the least likely of the three groups to think police should have more power over people like them; the mean score for the Middle Eastern Muslim group was significantly lower than either the Vietnamese or UK/Irish immigrant groups (see Table 12). Regarding whether people like them should have more influence over police, the Middle Eastern Muslim sample (Mean = 3.35; SD = 0.89) and Vietnamese sample (Mean = 3.33; SD = 0.60) felt more strongly than the UK/Irish group (Mean = 3.15; SD = 0.50) that people should have more influence over police. Table 12 indicates there was no statistical difference between the Middle Eastern Muslim and Vietnamese participants on this item, but there were significant differences between the UK/Irish immigrants and Middle Eastern Muslims and between UK/Irish immigrants and Vietnamese immigrants.

2.5.12 Trust as Willing Vulnerability

The trust as willing vulnerability scale includes measures that determine the extent to which participants felt comfortable or trusted police to do their job without public interference. Trust captures the notion that individuals perceive those they trust to have positive, moral, and caring intentions towards them (Midden & Huijts, 2009). Yesberg and Bradford (2018) argue that having trust in someone requires the trusting individual to be willing to accept a sense of vulnerability in the legitimacy (or not) of the actions of the entrusted person. In relation to police and expanded police powers resulting from the changing security landscape, individuals who score higher on a trust as willing vulnerability measure are more likely to approve of policing strategies like increased armed police or increased surveillance of communities because they are more willing to accept their own vulnerability (Yesberg & Bradford, 2018). In this context, trusting members of the public are more likely to accept police use of extreme force if they trust the police to maintain their safety and security.

A higher mean score on the *trust as willing vulnerability* scale suggests participants are quite comfortable in entrusting the police to make decisions to address crime and disorder, even when such decisions might directly impact on or intervene in people's lives. We found, on average, that there was some vulnerability to trust police to protect the community (Mean = 3.56; SD = 0.82). This did, however, vary between the immigrant groups. Specifically, the UK/Irish sample (Mean = 3.97; SD = 0.71) felt more comfortable entrusting police to intervene in their lives when compared to the Vietnamese (Mean = 3.56; SD = 0.78) and Middle Eastern Muslim (Mean = 3.46; SD = 0.85) participants (see

Table 12 for where the means difference significantly from each other). It is perhaps not surprising to see that for a group who has been the subject of increased surveillance due to the War on Terror, the Middle Eastern Muslim group was the least likely to express a vulnerability to trust police to act in their interests.

2.5.13 Motivational Postures

As highlighted earlier in this report, Braithwaite's (2003) *Theory of Defiance* is being used as one theoretical framework in the current project. Braithwaite argues that defiance can manifest in a variety of ways; what she calls motivational posturing. Motivational postures refer to an individual's psychological position towards an authority, and they are pre-cursors to subsequent compliance or non-compliance behaviour (Braithwaite, 2003). Three of Braithwaite's (2003) five originally developed motivational postures were measured in the *Sydney Immigrant Survey*: two defiant postures (resistance and disengagement) and one compliant posture (commitment) (see Murphy 2016 for a discussion of motivational posturing in the policing context).

Commitment represents a positive disposition towards authority and a moral obligation to cooperate and comply with authorities. Committed individuals view authorities as legitimate and entitled to be obeyed. However, *resistance* and *disengagement* denote a more negative outlook towards authorities and can signal defiant attitudes. *Resistance* refers to a doubt among the public that the police will act professionally and cooperatively with the public. As such, participants who adopt a resistant posture are more likely to view the police with hostility and may be more inclined to support actions or movements to reduce police powers (i.e., by taking a stand against police and resisting the power they yield). Similarly, *disengagement* also represents a form of defiance, but the key difference between resistance and disengagement is that disengaged individuals no longer see a purpose in challenging an authority. Instead, they seek to separate themselves from the influence of an authority. Here, they might avoid all contact with authorities or step outside the system so that authorities don't have reach over their behaviour. Disengagers also believe there will be little consequence to them for disobeying the law. The reality in the policing context is that people are unlikely to be able to step outside the system of being police, but they can avoid contact with police.

Braithwaite (2003) suggests that those who are more committed are more likely to comply or cooperate with authorities. However, those who are resistant or disengaged are

less likely to comply or cooperate with authorities as a way of expressing defiance toward an authority. While Braithwaite developed her motivational posturing constructs in the context of taxation and nursing home research, Murphy (2016) has taken and adapted her work into the policing context.

Three items were used to construct the *commitment* posture (e.g., *'Obeying police ultimately advantages everyone'*), five items were used to generate the *resistance* scale (e.g., *'As a society we need more people willing to take a stand against rude police'*), while four measures were used to create the *disengagement* scale (e.g., *'I don't really know what the police expect of me and I'm not about to ask'*). Higher scores on the commitment scale indicate greater commitment, while higher scores on the resistance and disengagement scales indicate greater levels of defiance. When looking at the mean scores for each of these three scales, results show that participants were generally committed to police (Mean = 4.02; SD = 0.66; see Figure 9). Participants reported some degree of resistance toward police (Mean = 3.54; SD = 0.71) but reported being neither engaged nor disengaged (Mean = 2.95; SD = 0.86) from police.

When examining each motivational posture among the three immigrant groups, findings showed the UK/Irish participants (Mean = 4.13; SD = 0.54) were slightly more committed to police when compared to the Middle Eastern Muslim (Mean = 4.05; SD = 0.72) or Vietnamese (Mean = 3.95; SD = 0.61) participants (see Table 12). Both the Middle Eastern Muslim and Vietnamese samples were more likely to be resistant (Mean = 3.59 and Mean = 3.54, respectively) than the UK/Irish immigrants (Mean = 3.35), and were also more likely to be disengaged from police (Mean = 3.02 and Mean = 3.96, respectively) when compared to the UK/Irish immigrant group (Mean = 2.63; see Figure 9). Interestingly, the Vietnamese immigrants reported being the most disengaged from police of the three immigrant groups. Table 12 indicates which mean scores differed significantly between the three immigrant groups.



Figure 9 Mean scores for Braithwaite's motivational postures for the total sample and for each of the three immigrant groups

2.5.14 Personal Norms regarding Police Authority and Use of Force

Personal norms regarding police authority and use of force describe the public's approval of institutional use of force in order to control crime and criminals. The Research Team developed two survey items to measure immigrants' norms regarding police use of force (e.g., *'Police SHOULD exert their authority in encounters, so they are not viewed as weak'*). A higher score on the scale suggests participants are more approving of coercive authoritative and use of force. The mean score for the scale for the total sample suggests that participants only somewhat agreed that police should be authoritative and use force to control crime and criminals (Mean = 3.45; SD = 0.72). When comparing the mean scores across the three immigrant groups, findings show Middle Eastern Muslim participants (Mean = 3.59; SD = 0.76) were slightly more approving of authoritative use of police force when compared to the other two immigrant groups (Vietnamese Mean = 3.37; SD = 0.71; UK/Irish Mean = 3.24; SD = 0.44). Table 12 presents the outcomes of t-tests showing statistical differences between the views of each immigrant group.

2.5.15 Authoritarian Attitudes

Authoritarian attitudes refer to personality traits that describe the subservient acceptance of authorities' decisions and use of aggression, and a strong commitment or adherence to conventional values, traditions, and norms (Altemeyer, 1998). To measure this concept, the survey included two items adapted from the work of Manganelli Rattazzi and colleagues (2007). One item measured general obedience and respect for authority (i.e., authoritarian submission; *'Obedience and respect for authority are the most important values children SHOULD learn'*) and one item measured the extent to which participants would approve of giving lawbreakers harsher sentences (i.e., authoritarian aggression; *'People who break the law SHOULD be given harsher sentences'*). It might be expected that those who hold more authoritarian attitudes will be more likely to support police efforts to use force and harsh sentences to control crime and criminals. A higher score on this 2-item scale is associated with stronger authoritarian attitudes. Findings show, on average, participants held slightly authoritarian attitudes (Mean = 3.74; SD = 0.80). Table 12 shows that Middle Eastern Muslim participants (Mean = 3.90; SD = 0.82) have the strongest authoritarian attitudes when compared to the UK/Irish (Mean = 3.63; SD = 0.70) and Vietnamese (Mean = 3.62; SD = 0.78) samples. Table 12 also shows where these differences are statistically significant.

2.5.16 Willingness to Cooperate with Police

The final set of questions in Section 5 of the survey measured immigrants' willingness to voluntarily cooperate with police. The public's willingness to cooperate voluntarily with police is essential. Police rely heavily on members of the community to come forward and report crime and victimisation to police. Without members of the public contacting police to report crime or victimisation, police will be ineffective in their ability to solve crime (Murphy et al., 2008). Police also rely on the community to report potential terror threats. Evidence suggests that new immigrants can often be reluctant to contact police in times of need (van Craen, 2013). Research also suggests that Muslims can often feel reluctant to report terror threats to police (Innes, 2006). This is because many Muslims report suspicion and resentment of counter-terrorism policing and laws (Cherney & Murphy 2016; Dunn et al 2016; Spalek 2010).

Participants in the survey were first asked how many times they had been in contact with police in the previous 24-month period. It was found that 44.6% of participants had prior contact with police during this time. Exploring this further, 43.7% of those who had contact with police indicated that police had initiated the contact, while 56.3% indicated that they themselves had initiated the contact.

Participants were then asked whether they would willingly cooperate with police, both in traditional crime prevention activities as well as in counter-terrorism prevention. Six items were included to measure participants' self-reported willingness to cooperate with police in their crime control efforts; participants were asked about their willingness to voluntarily report victimisation or crime to police (e.g., *'How likely would you be to provide the police with information to catch a criminal'*). These items were adapted from the work of Sunshine and Tyler (2003) and Murphy and colleagues (2008), where a higher score on the scale indicates a greater self-reported willingness to cooperate with police. A further five items were included to gauge participants' self-reported willingness to cooperate with police in counter-terrorism by assessing their willingness to report potential terror threats to police (e.g., *'How likely would you be to report to the following to police… A person overheard discussing their plans to carry out a terrorist attack'*). These items were adapted from the work of Murphy et al (2015) and Huq et al (2011). Again, a higher score on the terrorism cooperation scale indicates a greater propensity to want to assist police in terrorism prevention.

As can be seen in Figure 10, on average, participants indicated they would be very willing to cooperate with police in traditional crime-control prevention (Mean = 4.12; SD = 0.70) and in counter-terrorism prevention (Mean = 4.21; SD = 0.87). Participants were more willing to cooperate with police in counter-terrorism policing than crime prevention. When broken down by immigrant group, overall the UK/Irish group (Mean = 4.38; SD = 0.60) was slightly more willing to cooperate with police in crime control efforts, followed by the Middle Eastern Muslim sample (Mean = 4.22; SD = 0.67) and then the Vietnamese sample (Mean = 3.95; SD = 0.73). This parallels the level of disengagement reported by each immigrant group in the motivational postures section above. In terms of cooperating in counter-terrorism efforts, the Middle Eastern Muslim sample (Mean = 4.37; SD = 0.85) and UK/Irish sample (Mean = 4.39; SD = 0.70) were equally willing to report terror threats to police. Vietnamese respondents were the least willing of the three immigrant groups to

report terror threats to police (Mean = 4.00; SD = 0.90; see Table 12 for where the mean differences are statistically different). Hence, for both forms of cooperation, the Vietnamese immigrants were least likely to say they would cooperate with police; the Vietnamese community was also the most likely to report being disengaged from police, so these findings are not unsurprising.

We also examined differences in willingness to cooperate with police between first- and second-generation immigrants. As noted above, van Craen (2014) found that newer immigrants (i.e., first generation immigrants) in Belgium were less likely to contact police to report crime or victimisation. Unlike van Craen (2014), in our survey we found that newer immigrants were in fact more willing to say they would report crime or victimisation to police (1st generation immigrant Mean = 4.19; SD = 0.70; 2nd generation immigrant Mean = 4.05; SD = 0.70; this difference was statistically significant, $t(901)=3.00$, $p<.05$); this pattern of findings was consistent for each of the three immigrant groups. For the cooperation in terrorism reporting scale, we again found newer immigrants to be slightly more willing than second generation immigrants to report terror threats to police (1st generation immigrant Mean = 4.26; SD = 0.89; 2nd generation immigrant Mean = 4.16; SD = 0.85; but this difference did not reach statistical significance, $t(901)=1.73$, $p>0.05$). When broken down into each of the three immigrant groups, first and second-generation immigrants were equally as willing to cooperate with police to prevent terrorism.



Figure 10 Mean scores for Willingness to Cooperate with Police for the total sample and for each of the three immigrant groups

Table 12 Perceptions of Government and Police for the total sample and for each of the three immigrant groups

Variable	Total Sample		UK/Irish		Middle Eastern Muslim		Vietnamese	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Trust in the government	3.31	1.01	3.42[b]	0.85	3.07[a,c]	1.13	3.52[b]	0.86
Cultural norms regarding police	3.44	0.63	3.85[b,c]	0.54	3.24[a,c]	0.61	3.54[a,b]	0.59
Solidarity with police	2.87	0.70	3.04[c]	0.60	2.93[c]	0.65	2.75[a,b]	0.75
Police legitimacy								
Moral alignment	3.60	0.72	3.79[b]	0.71	3.46[a,c]	0.78	3.68[b]	0.62
Trust and confidence in Police	3.62	0.67	4.06[b,c]	0.57	3.51[a,c]	0.65	3.62[a,b]	0.67
Moral obligation to obey Police	3.90	0.63	3.86	0.51	3.99[c]	0.69	3.82[b]	0.59
Coercive obligation to obey/Dull compulsion	2.85	0.91	2.48[b,c]	0.75	2.85[a]	0.92	2.95[a]	0.92
Procedural justice	3.36	0.67	3.47[b]	0.61	3.26[a,c]	0.69	3.43[b]	0.66
Distributive justice	3.02	0.77	3.32[b]	0.65	2.78[a,c]	0.78	3.18[b]	0.74
Bounded authority	2.68	0.90	2.50[b]	0.57	2.86[a,c]	0.99	2.54[b]	0.84
Police effectiveness	3.60	0.81	3.93[b,c]	0.65	3.52[a,b]	0.91	3.58[a,c]	0.72
Perceived power distance between public and police								
How much power do police have over people like you?	3.69	0.87	3.90[c]	0.86	3.76	0.89	3.55[a]	0.83
How much influence do people like you have over police?	2.58	1.10	2.19[b,c]	0.93	2.56[a]	1.22	2.71[a]	0.97
Power distance norms								
How much power do you think police SHOULD have over people like you?	2.83	0.80	2.90[b]	0.41	2.67[a,c]	0.93	2.97[b]	0.71
How much influence do you think people like you SHOULD have over the police?	3.32	0.74	3.15[b,c]	0.50	3.35[a]	0.89	3.33[a]	0.60
Trust as willing vulnerability	3.56	0.82	3.97[b,c]	0.71	3.46[a]	0.85	3.56[a]	0.78
Motivational postures								
Commitment	4.02	0.66	4.13[c]	0.54	4.05[c]	0.72	3.95[a,b]	0.61
Resistance	3.54	0.71	3.35[b,c]	0.50	3.59[a]	0.83	3.54[a]	0.62

Variable	Total Sample		UK/Irish		Middle Eastern Muslim		Vietnamese	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Disengagement	2.95	0.86	2.63[b,c]	0.67	3.02[a]	0.91	2.96[a]	0.83
Personal norms regarding police use of force	3.45	0.72	3.24[b]	0.44	3.59[a,c]	0.76	3.37[b]	0.71
Authoritarian attitudes	3.74	0.80	3.63[b]	0.70	3.90[a,c]	0.82	3.62[b]	0.78
Cooperation with police								
Crime control Cooperation	4.12	0.70	4.38[b,c]	0.60	4.22[a,c]	0.67	3.95[a,b]	0.73
Counter-terrorism Cooperation	4.21	0.87	4.38[c]	0.60	4.37[c]	0.85	4.00[a,b]	0.90

t-test results: [a]=significantly different from UK immigrants at $p<0.05$; [b]=significantly different from Middle Eastern Muslim immigrants at $p<0.05$; [c]=significantly different from Vietnamese immigrants at $p<0.05$.

2.6 Bivariate Relationships

The previous section of this report presented some of the descriptive results obtained in each of the various subsections of the *Sydney Immigrant Survey*. This section of the report presents the bi-variate associations between some of the key concepts of interest. The objectives of this study were to determine the drivers of immigrants': (a) disengagement from police; (b) their trust and confidence in police; and (c) their willingness to cooperate with police in different policing contexts (i.e., in crime prevention and in terrorism prevention). Hence, Table 13 presents some of the bi-variate correlations between key variables discussed in previous sections. Table 13 also indicates where these relationships are statistically significant. As can be seen in Table 13, there are a number of variables associated with each of the key dependent variables: disengagement; trust in police; cooperation in crime control; cooperation in terrorism prevention.

With respect to correlates of disengagement from police, immigrants were more likely to be disengaged if they perceived police to be procedurally unjust and distributively unjust, if they believed police were ineffective, and if police overstepped the boundaries of their authority. Immigrants who had trust and confidence in police were also less likely to be disengaged. Interestingly, if immigrants felt that members of their own immigrant group viewed police negatively, they too were also more likely to be disengaged. If immigrants felt police threatened their identities, they were also more likely to be disengaged from

police. Finally, those who felt a stronger sense of coerced obligation to obey police were more likely to report being disengaged from police.

Table 13 Bivariate correlations (*r*) between some key scales and disengagement, trust and confidence in police, and willingness to cooperate with police for the total sample

Variable	Disengagement	Trust and confidence in police	Crime control Cooperation	Counter-terrorism Cooperation
	R	*r*	*r*	*R*
Australian identity	0.01	0.11***	0.25***	0.24***
Ethnic identity	0.11***	-0.01	0.05	0.09**
Moral identity	-0.07*	0.15***	0.14***	0.11***
Democratic collective identity	-0.03	0.12***	0.19***	0.21***
Status seeking identity	-0.02	0.09**	0.11***	0.04
Autonomy identity	0.08*	0.06	0.14***	0.13***
Moral identity threat	0.27***	-0.52***	-0.24***	-0.07*
Democratic collective identity threat	0.31***	-0.57***	-0.32***	-0.08*
Status seeking threat	0.19***	-0.50***	-0.28***	-0.10**
Autonomy threat	0.19***	-0.44***	-0.17***	-0.01
Stigmatisation	0.25***	-0.43***	-0.17***	-0.00
Propensity to trust others	-0.05	0.26***	0.13***	0.07*
Trust as willing vulnerability	-0.27***	0.52***	0.30***	0.04
Cultural norms regarding police	-0.33***	0.71***	0.32***	0.09**
Police solidarity	-0.24***	0.41***	0.34***	0.18***
Moral alignment	-0.26***	0.52***	0.24***	0.10**
Trust & confidence	-0.43***	---	0.44***	0.17***
Moral obligation to obey	-0.23***	0.36***	0.35***	0.15***
Coerced obligation to obey	0.40***	-0.35***	-0.21***	-0.13***
Procedural justice	-0.32***	0.66***	0.40***	0.12***
Distributive justice	-0.35***	0.58***	0.25***	0.05
Bounded authority	0.41***	-0.54***	-0.29***	-0.08*
Police effectiveness	-0.26***	0.56***	0.36***	0.11***
Disengagement	---	-0.43***	-0.21***	-0.07*

*Significant correlation at *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001*

With respect to correlates of immigrants' trust and confidence in police, there were several very strong relationships. Immigrants were more likely to trust police if they were perceived to be acting in a just manner (both procedural justice and distributive justice), were not seen to be overstepping their authority, and were perceived as effective. Like for disengagement, those immigrants who felt police threatened their identity were also less likely to trust police. The cultural norms regarding police measure was one of the strongest correlates with trust and confidence in police. If immigrants believed their own immigrant group held negative views of police, then they too had little trust and confidence in police.

It is interesting to note that there were some differences in the correlations with immigrants' willingness to cooperate with police in crime prevention efforts and in their willingness to cooperate with police in terrorism prevention. For the most part, immigrants were more likely to say they would cooperate with police in crime control efforts if they saw police as effective and just, if they were trusting of police, and if they felt a moral obligation to obey police. Those immigrants who felt coerced to obey police were less likely to want to cooperate with police in crime prevention. While these were also correlates with willingness to cooperate in terrorism prevention, the associations were much weaker, suggesting that immigrants distinguish between terrorism cooperation and crime cooperation. It seems perhaps that immigrants will assist police in terrorism prevention regardless of how they perceive police. When it comes to reporting crime and victimisation, however, this depends largely on how immigrants perceive police. If they perceive them negatively on a number of attitudinal indicators, they will be less likely to report crime or victimisation.